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1. Christy Cutbill McCormick, Exporting the First Amendment: America’s Response to
Religious Persecution Abroad, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 283, 317 (1998) (discussing the
historical foundations of U.S. asylum law). 
2. See Lance Hampton, Step Away from the Altar, Joab: The Failure of Religious Asylum
Claims in the United States in Light of the Primacy of Asylum Within Human Rights, 12
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 476 (2002); Mary McGee Light, Note, The Well-
Founded Fear Standard in Refugee Asylum: Will It Still Provide Hope for the Oppressed?, 45
DRAKE L. REV. 789, 790 (1997).  The persecuted foreigners who comprised so many of our
early immigrants played a significant role in the development of the new country.  See John V.
Hanford III, Introduction to U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 108TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT ON
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 2004, at xv, xv (J. Comm. Print 2004), available at
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/archives/109/20429.pdf; Wendy Davis & Angela
Atchue, No Physical Harm, No Asylum: Denying a Safe Haven for Refugees, 5 TEX. F. ON C.L.
& C.R. 81, 120 (2000).
3. Light, supra note 2, at 790.
4. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 6401-6481 (West 2005 & Supp. 2006).  See generally Hampton, supra
note 2, at 478 (calling the Act a “clear policy statement of religious freedoms” that creates “a
bureaucratic mechanism by which the United States might monitor and encourage religious
freedoms in the world”); Craig B. Mousin, Standing with the Persecuted: Adjudicating
Religious Asylum Claims After the Enactment of the International Religious Freedom Act, 2003
BYU L. REV. 541, 541 (2003) (describing the Act’s purpose of counteracting “renewed and
increased assaults on freedom of religion throughout the globe”).
5. Steven Wales, Comment, Remembering the Persecuted: An Analysis of the
International Religious Freedom Act, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 579, 582, 593 (2002).  The Act
109
Distinguishing True Persecution from Legitimate
Prosecution in American Asylum Law* 
I. Introduction
The first waves of European immigrants to land on American shores were
often comprised of refugees fleeing various forms of persecution.1
Throughout its history, the United States has considered itself a safe harbor
where the oppressed and suffering of the world may find rest.2  As early as
1783, George Washington declared the young nation “open to receive the
persecuted and oppressed of all nations.”3  Congress recently affirmed this
pledge by passing the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.4
Although the Act considered only the realm of religious persecution, it
significantly reaffirmed the nation’s commitment to the world’s persecuted,
receiving unanimous support in both chambers of Congress and officially
incorporating religious freedom into American foreign policy.5  
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boldly articulated America’s commitment to protect those persecuted on the basis of religious
belief: 
The right to freedom of religion undergirds the very origin and existence of the
United States.  Many of our nation’s founders fled religious persecution abroad,
cherishing in their hearts and minds the ideal of religious freedom.  They
established in law, as a fundamental right and as a pillar of our nation, the right
to freedom of religion.  From its birth to this day, the United States has prized this
legacy of religious freedom and honored this heritage by standing for religious
freedom and offering refuge to those suffering religious persecution.
22 U.S.C. §6401(a) (2000).  
6. This tradition is perhaps best articulated in the inscription at the base of the Statue of
Liberty: 
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.
Susan Burkhardt, The Contours of Conformity: Behavioral Decision Theory and the Pitfalls of
the 2002 Reforms of Immigration Procedures, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 35, 36-37 (2004) (quoting
EMMA LAZARUS, The New Colossus, in THE POEMS OF EMMA LAZARUS 2 (Boston, Houghton,
Mifflin 1889)).
7. 420 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2005), vacated, 429 F.3d 1153 (5th Cir. 2005).  
8. See Press Release, Alliance Def. Fund, Coalition Continues to Grow for Chinese
Christian Denied Asylum in U.S. (Oct. 4, 2005), available at http://www.alliancedefensefund.
org/news/pressrelease.aspx?cid=3551; Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom,
China/Asylum Issues: USCIRF Deeply Troubled by 5th Circuit Decision in Li v. Gonzales (Oct.
3, 2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/mediaroom/press/2005/october/10032005_china.
html; Brent Tantillo, Taking Freedom’s Side, DEMOCRACY PROJECT, Aug. 15, 2005,
http://www.democracy-project.com/archives/001781.html.
9. Li, 420 F.3d at 503. 
10. Id. at 504.
In light of America’s strong tradition of protecting the persecuted and this
recent congressional action affirming that heritage,6 many were surprised and
troubled when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit issued its ruling
in Li v. Gonzales7 on August 9th, 2005.8  The court’s holding placed into sharp
relief a facet of U.S. immigration law that is deceptively straightforward in
theory but obscure in practice: the distinction between true persecution and
legitimate criminal prosecution.  Accordingly, Li offers an instructive
introduction to the difficulty courts regularly face in deciding whether a
prosecuted alien is entitled to asylum.
On November 4, 1995, Xiaodong Li arrived in the United States after
fleeing his native People’s Republic of China.9  Before leaving his homeland,
Li had been active in an illegal underground church of six or seven members
that met in his home each Sunday to study the Bible.10  In December of 1994,








16. Id. at 505.
17. Id. at 504-05.





23. Many sources in this discussion refer to the INS, or the Immigration and Naturalization
Service.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service is now within the Department of
Homeland Security, renamed as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: 
religious materials, and finding none, they warned Li not to spread such
contraband.11  The group continued to meet until April of 1995 when the
police again raided Li’s home, this time finding religious materials prohibited
by Chinese law.12  The police identified Li as the group’s leader, arrested him,
and took him in handcuffs to the police station, where they told him to kneel.13
When Li refused, the police kicked his legs from behind, struck his head, and
pulled his hair, forcing him to his knees.14  The police then sought Li’s
confession that he was involved in an illegal religious gathering and had
organized an illegal church, but Li refused to plead guilty.15  During this
interrogation, the officials beat and shocked Li with a black electric baton
when they disliked Li’s responses.16  After two hours of this treatment, Li
signed a written confession pleading guilty to conducting an illegal gathering
and leading an illegal underground church.17  For the next five days, the police
detained him under abusive conditions until his uncle paid his bail.18  As a
result of this incident, Li lost his job, and authorities forced him to clean
public toilets without pay.19
Government officials set Li’s hearing for six months after his release from
jail.  Li feared that a trial would result in a prison sentence, so he fled his
homeland and arrived in the United States in late 1995.20  In May of 1999, Li
learned through family members that the police were still searching for him
and that his friend and fellow church leader, Gao Ying, had been arrested and
given a two-year prison sentence.21  Later that year, Li applied for asylum,
testifying to U.S. immigration officials that he believed he would face further
arrest, torture, and imprisonment because of his religious beliefs if returned
to China.22  The immigration judge initially granted Li asylum, finding that he
would probably face continued religious persecution if returned to China, but
on appeal, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)23 convinced the
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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On March 1, 2003, service and benefit functions of the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Services (INS) transitioned into the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) as the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).
USCIS is responsible for the administration of immigration and naturalization
adjudication functions and establishing immigration services policies and
priorities.  These functions include: 
. . . 
xx! adjudication of asylum and refugee applications . . . .
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., About USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM1
0000045f3d6a1RCRD&vgnextchannel=2af29c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d6a1RCRD
(last visited Feb. 2, 2007).  For purposes of clarity, much of this discussion retains the “INS”
terminology to follow the majority of cited literature and case law.
24. Li, 420 F.3d at 506.
25. Id. at 511.
26. Li v. Gonzalez, 429 F.3d 1153 (5th Cir. 2005), vacating as moot 420 F.3d 500.  In
vacating its earlier decision, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Department of Homeland Security
cited “new evidence” in requesting that officials reopen Mr. Li’s case.  Id. at 1153.  More likely,
the Department found its position politically untenable in the wake of considerable public
outcry.  See Press Release, U.S. Comm’n on Int’l Religious Freedom, China/Asylum Issues:
Fifth Circuit Vacates Troubling Asylum Decision on Religious Freedom in China (Nov. 4,
2005), available at http://www.uscirf.gov/mediaroom/press/2005/november/11042005_asylum
Decision.htm1 (discussing the vacating opinion); supra note 8.
27. Observers often note the difficulty with distinguishing persecution from prosecution.
See Dawn Miller, Holding States to Their Convention Obligations: The United Nations
Convention Against Torture and the Need for a Broad Interpretation of State Action, 17 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 299, 311 (2003) (noting the importance of differentiating between lawful
prosecution and persecution, and recognizing that “there is often a fine line distinguishing the
two”); Shelley M. Hall, Comment, Quixotic Attempt? The Ninth Circuit, The BIA, and the
Search for a Human Rights Framework to Asylum Law, 73 WASH. L. REV. 105, 127 (1998)
(“Identifying when legitimate prosecution ends and persecution begins poses great difficulties
in asylum law.”). 
Board of Immigration Appeals that the Chinese government had not
persecuted Li on account of his religious beliefs but had merely prosecuted
him for his criminal activity.24  On August 9, 2005, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit agreed, holding that because “Li’s punishment was for his
[criminal] activities and not for his religion,” the United States would return
him to the Chinese government.25
Did Xiadong Li’s treatment amount to legitimate criminal prosecution for
violating Chinese law, or had Li fled governmental persecution for his
religious beliefs?  The question became moot when the Fifth Circuit vacated
its earlier opinion,26 but Li emphasized a critical area within immigration law
that remains poorly defined and unevenly applied.27  The purpose of this
comment is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the fluctuating
boundary line that divides true persecution from mere prosecution.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/4
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28. See Hampton, supra note 2, at 463; Karen Musalo, Claims for Protection Based on
Religion or Belief, 16 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 165, 166 (2004) (U.K.); Kathryn A. Dittrick Heebner,
Comment, Protecting the Truly Persecuted: Restructuring the Flawed Asylum System, 39 U.S.F.
L. REV. 549, 551-52 (2005).  
29. Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human
Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1215 (1994).
Nonetheless, the following pages are not merely a synthesis, they are also a
critique, for the merit of any such effort lies in its potential to help ensure that
this ambiguous area of law becomes more coherent and consistent with the
unambiguous American promise of protecting Earth’s persecuted. 
Part II begins by examining the development and structure of asylum and
withholding of removal, the two chief legal mechanisms available to an alien
fleeing persecution.  Next, Part III considers the fundamental distinction
between actual persecution and mere criminal prosecution by setting forth the
general rule that prosecution is distinct from persecution and then noting
several exceptions to this general standard, along with commonly applied
factors that influence such determinations.  Having constructed this analytical
framework, Part IV then applies it to four scenarios where the
persecution/prosecution distinction most frequently arises: illegal departure,
compulsory military service, domestic intelligence gathering, and
antigovernment activities.  Finally, Part V emphasizes two areas of
pronounced ambiguity and disagreement in this arena and confronts the
tendency of lower immigration courts to apply incorrect legal principles to the
prosecution/persecution analysis.  Part V concludes by arguing that a uniform
understanding of this distinction is essential to justly adjudicate asylum claims
and that judges and policymakers must do more to harmonize this discordant
area of law so that the United States can better live up to its historical
commitment of protecting the truly persecuted. 
II. Asylum and Withholding - The Legal Framework Protecting Victims of
Persecution 
International and domestic protections for individuals fleeing persecution
originated in the aftermath of World War II, when the international
community acknowledged its failure to respond to the Nazi’s persecution and
extermination of millions of racial, religious, and political minorities.28
Indeed, the Holocaust encouraged the creation of an international norm
protecting the right to freedom of thought and belief,29 which was
subsequently enshrined in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes the freedom to change his religion or belief, and
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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30. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 74, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
31. U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT 23 (2005) [hereinafter
2005 ANNUAL REPORT]. 
32. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.  
33. Id. pmbl. 
34. Id. art. 1(A)(2). 
35. That the United States was not a signatory is particularly ironic given American
ambivalence to the dangers facing European Jews leading up to the Second World War.  This
lack of concern was illustrated in 1939, when Cuba and the United States refused harbor to a
passenger ship filled with 900 German Jews, forcing the refugees to return to Europe where they
were ultimately killed by the Nazis.  See Tuan N. Samahon, Note, The Religion Clauses and
Political Asylum: Religious Persecution Claims and the Religious Membership-Conversion
Imposter Problem, 88 GEO. L.J. 2211, 2212 n.7 (2000). 
36. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606
U.N.T.S. 267.  For the proposition that America’s accession to the Protocol ratified the
obligations of the 1951 Convention, see Hampton, supra note 2, at 468; April Adell, Note, Fear
of Persecution for Opposition to Violations of the International Human Right to Found a
Family as a Legal Entitlement to Asylum for Chinese Refugees, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 789, 797
n.39 (1996); Samahon, supra note 35, at 2213. 
37. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(42) (2000)) (incorporating the basic provisions of the 1967 Protocol).
38. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987); Hampton, supra note 2, at 465;
Adell, supra note 36, at 797 (noting that the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted to conform U.S.
law to the 1967 Protocol and to “both safeguard international human rights and effectuate the
humanitarian interests of the United States”); Heebner, supra note 28, at 552; Light, supra note
2, at 792.  For additional discussion regarding the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, see
Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United States: The Immigration
Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 303, 312 (2001) (noting
that the Supreme Court has held that if “one thing is clear from the legislative history of the
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and
observance.”30
Protecting these and other inherent and universal rights became “a matter
of global concern after the horrors of World War II”31 that eventually
culminated in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.32  The Convention recalled that the Universal Declaration protects
“fundamental rights and freedoms without discrimination”33 and required
signatory nations to offer asylum to refugees if they had been persecuted on
account of political opinion, race, nationality, social group, or religion.34
Although the United States was not an original signatory to the Convention,35
it accepted that instrument’s obligations by ratifying the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.36  In 1980, Congress passed the
Refugee Act,37 which established a domestic basis for granting asylum in
conformity with America’s obligations under the 1967 Protocol,38 as well as
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/4
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definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’s primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” (quoting Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37));
Andrew Bonavia, Note, United States v. Rodriguez-Roman: Prosecuting the Persecuted, 22
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1039, 1049 (1997); John Hans Thomas, Note, Seeing Through a
Glass, Darkly: The Social Context of “Particular Social Groups” in Lwin v. INS, 1999 BYU
L. REV. 799, 802.
39. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK
OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 45 (2004) (“The Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by
the Refugee Act of 1980, regulates U.S. asylum policy as well as governing refugee procedures.
The Act, for the first time, established a statutory basis for granting asylum in the United States
consistent with the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.”). 
40. See Anwen Hughes, Asylum and Withholding of Removal — A Brief Overview of the
Substantive Law, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW 2005, at 293, 297 (PLI Corporate Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1477, 2005); Daniel J. Smith, Political Asylum — Well-
Founded Fear of Persecution, 13 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 1 (1991).  
41. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158(b)(1) (West 2005) (“The Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Attorney General may grant asylum to an alien . . . if the Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Attorney General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of section
1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.”).
42.  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)42(A) (2000); see also 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, supra note 39, at 40 (noting that this definition “generally conforms to the
international definition of refugee found in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees”).
43. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b) (2006).  
the 1951 Convention.39  Current asylum and withholding provisions derive
from this legislation.
A. Asylum and Withholding
U.S. immigration law affords persecuted aliens within the United States
two primary avenues of protection: a grant of asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)
or withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).40  To be eligible for
asylum, an alien must demonstrate that she is a “refugee,”41 defined as one
who is unwilling or unable to return to her home country “because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion . . . .”42  Thus, an alien may qualify as a refugee if she has suffered
past persecution or if she has a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of one of the five enumerated factors.43  The law presumes the
applicant has a well-founded fear of future persecution if she has suffered past
persecution, but immigration officials may rebut this presumption if her home
country has undergone a “fundamental change in circumstances” or if she
could avoid further persecution by relocating elsewhere within her home
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
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44. Id.
45. Id.
46. E.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1987); Malty v. Ashcroft, 381
F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2004)  (“Eligibility for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future
persecution requires an applicant to satisfy both a subjective and objective test.” (citing Singh
v. INS, 134 F.3d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1998))).
47. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1).
48. Kotasv v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848
F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir. 1988) (per curiam)). 
49. Shirazi-Parsa v. INS, 14 F.3d 1424, 1427 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Acewicz v. INS, 984
F.2d 1056, 1061 (9th Cir. 1993)), overruled on other grounds by Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 995
(9th Cir. 1996).
50. The Board of Immigration Appeals is the ultimate authority within the Department of
Justice in interpreting statutes and regulations affording protections to aliens fleeing
persecution.  See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 326 (9th ed.
2004). 
51. Id. at 329-30 (citing In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled in part
by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987)). 
52. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000); 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i); see also INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 443 (1987) (a successful asylum applicant “does not have a right to
remain in the United States; he or she is simply eligible for asylum, if the Attorney General, in
his discretion, chooses to grant it”); In re Pula, 19 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 1987)).  In
exercising their discretion, immigration judges should consider the totality of the circumstances,
and although the alien carries the burden of showing that a favorable exercise of discretion is
called for, the threatened “persecution should outweigh all but the most egregious adverse
discretionary factors.”  Hughes, supra note 40, at 313 (citing In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. 357
country.44  Even if the asylum applicant has not suffered previous persecution,
she may become eligible for asylum by showing a “well-founded fear of
persecution” on account of one of the protected grounds.45  This fear of
persecution includes both a subjective and objective component.46  The
asylum applicant bears the burden, according to federal regulation,47 of
demonstrating the objective component through “‘credible, direct, and specific
evidence in the record of facts that would support a reasonable fear’ of
persecution”48 and satisfying the subjective component through “credible
testimony that he genuinely fears persecution.”49
The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board or BIA)50 has recognized four
elements for a successful asylum claim: (1) the alien has endured past
persecution or fears future persecution; (2) the fear is “well-founded”; (3) the
persecution is on “account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion”; and (4) the alien is unwilling or
unable to return to her native country or the country she last resided in
because of persecution or her well founded fear of persecution.51  Once an
alien demonstrates her eligibility, the immigration judge exercises his
discretion to grant or deny the asylum application,52 but discretionary denial
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/4
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(B.I.A. 1996)).  Further, Kathryn Dittrick Heebner argues that the broad discretion immigration
judges exercise in granting asylum is often “employed in a haphazard manner and produces
illogical results,” and as a result, she proposes several solutions for resolving the lack of
uniformity in discretionary rulings.  Heebner, supra note 28, at 550, 568-73.
53. Donald W. Yoo, Exploring the Doctrine of Imputed Political Opinion and Its
Application in the Ninth Circuit, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 391, 393 (2005); Sachin D. Adarkar,
Comment Political Asylum and Political Freedom: Moving Towards a Just Definition of
“Persecution on Account of Political Opinion” Under the Refugee Act, 42 UCLA L. REV. 181,
187 (1994) (citing Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1022 (2d Cir. 1994)).
54. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b).
55. Id. § 208.16(b)(1)-(2).
56. Id. § 208.16(b)(1)(i)(A).
57. Id. § 208.16(b)(2).
cannot be arbitrary, for the government must show a reasonable basis for not
granting asylum to an eligible alien.53
The second avenue open to an otherwise deportable alien fleeing
persecution is withholding of removal, a remedy available when an alien
meets her burden of establishing that her “life or freedom would be threatened
in the proposed country of removal on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”54  As with
asylum, an alien seeking withholding can establish eligibility by showing
either past persecution or a “future threat to life or freedom.”55  Mirroring the
past persecution ground for asylum, if the alien has suffered previous
persecution on account of a protected ground, a court presumes that
persecutors would threaten her life or freedom in the future.  The INS can
rebut this presumption by showing a “fundamental change in circumstances”
that removes the threat or by the applicant’s ability to avoid future threats to
her life or freedom by relocating within the proposed country of removal.56
If the withholding applicant has not suffered past persecution, she may still
establish eligibility by showing that:
[H]is or her life or freedom would be threatened in the future in a
country if he or she can establish that it would be more likely than
not that he or she would be persecuted on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion upon removal to that country.57
If an applicant successfully demonstrates either past persecution or a future
threat to life or freedom, immigration officials may not return her to the
country where she fears persecution unless conditions there change so as to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
118 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:109
58. Id. § 208.16(b)(1)(A), (d)(1). 
59. Id. § 208.16(f) (“Nothing in this section . . . shall prevent the Service from removing
an alien to a third country other than the country to which removal has been withheld or
deferred.”). 
60. See Heebner, supra note 28, at 555.
61. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987).
62. Id. at 430 & n.10 (“The section literally provides for withholding of deportation only
if the alien’s life or freedom ‘would’ be threatened in the country to which he would be
deported; it does not require withholding if the alien ‘might’ or ‘could’ be subject to
persecution.” (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 422 (1984))).
63. Heebner, supra note 28, at 555.
64. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440 (rejecting the notion that “because an applicant only
has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has no ‘well-
founded fear’ of the event happening”).
65. Id. at 431 (“That the fear must be ‘well-founded’ does not . . . transform the standard
into a ‘more likely than not’ one.  One can certainly have a well-founded fear of an event
happening when there is less than a 50% chance of the occurrence taking place.”).
66. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2000); Heebner, supra note 28, at 553.
67. See, e.g., Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443; Boctor v. Gonzales, No. 05-2530, 2007
WL 162839, at *4 (7th Cir. Jan. 24, 2007) (“Unlike asylum, which is discretionary, withholding
of removal is a mandatory form of relief . . . .” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(a))); Adarkar,
supra note 53, at 187. 
make future persecution unlikely,58 although officials may remove a successful
applicant to a third country that does not threaten persecution.59 
The fundamental difference between asylum and withholding of removal
is the different level of proof required by each.60  In INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that the well-founded fear standard required for
asylum is lower than the standard needed for withholding of removal.61  The
“would be threatened” element for withholding of removal requires the
applicant to “establish by objective evidence that it is more likely than not that
he or she will be subject to persecution upon deportation,”62 or in other words,
at least a fifty-one percent probability of persecution.63  Less stringently, the
“well-founded fear” required for asylum exists when “persecution is a
reasonable possibility.”64  Thus, an alien seeking asylum need not demonstrate
that future persecution is more likely than not to occur.65
Additionally, asylum and withholding differ in their respective forms of
relief.  After becoming eligible for asylum by showing a well-founded fear of
persecution, an immigration judge affords the alien permanent resident status
at the judge’s discretion.  Asylum is unavailable, however, to aliens who fail
to apply within one year of arriving in the United States.66  In contrast, when
an immigration judge determines an applicant is eligible for withholding of
removal, the judge has no discretion in withholding the alien’s deportation to
the country in question,67 although the government may deport the alien to a
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68. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1)(A), (d)(1) (2006).  
69. Id. § 208.16(b), (d)(1); see also 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra
note 39, at 40. 
70. Mousin, supra note 4, at 573.
71. See Sahi v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 587, 589-90 (9th Cir. 2005); Eric T. Johnson, Religious
Persecution: A Viable Basis for Seeking Refugee Status in the United States?, 1996 BYU L.
REV. 757, 763 (1996); Mousin, supra note 4, at 574.  Noting that the primary responsibility for
defining “persecution” lies with the BIA, the Sahi court stated, “The Board has failed to
discharge that responsibility.  Neither the parties’ research nor our own has brought to light a
case in which the BIA has defined ‘persecution.’ . . . We haven’t a clue as to what it thinks
religious persecution is.”  Sahi, 416 F.3d at 588-89.  But see Hughes, supra note 40, at 300
(noting that most commentators agree that arriving at a universal definition of persecution is
“not a useful exercise” given the variety of harms inflicted and the varied contexts producing
such harms, and that a general consensus exists that “threats to life and freedom[] are always
persecution, as are serious physical harm or other serious violations of human rights”).
72. Krotova v. Gonzales, 416 F.3d 1080, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Korablina v. INS,
158 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir.
2000); Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 1996).
73. Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Gonzales v. INS, 82
safe third country or return her to the original country if changed conditions
sufficiently reduce the threat of persecution.68
Notwithstanding their distinct burdens of proof and remedies, asylum and
withholding of removal essentially entail the same two-step analysis, requiring
an applicant to show that she has (1) suffered past persecution or is threatened
by future persecution and (2) that this persecution is “on account” of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.69  Thus, the two central questions for both forms of relief are whether
the conduct complained of rises to the level of “persecution,” and if so,
whether that persecution was “on account” of one of the five enumerated
grounds.  A brief discussion of these foundational concepts is instructive in
understanding when state prosecution becomes protected persecution.
B. Defining “Persecution”
One of the most contentious issues in asylum law has been distinguishing
between true, protected persecution and lesser manifestations of violence,
such as “discrimination, harassment, civil strife, or random violence.”70
Neither the 1951 Convention, its 1967 Protocol, or the Refugee Act of 1980,
which implemented the Convention, defines “persecution.”71  The Ninth
Circuit has defined the term as the “infliction of suffering or harm upon those
who differ (in race, religion or political opinion) in a way regarded as
offensive.”72  Courts generally require that the suffering or harm in question
be severe, and recognize that persecution is “an extreme concept that does not
include every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”73  Conduct
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F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 1996); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1243 (3d Cir. 1993).  Additionally,
the government or persons the government is unable or unwilling to control must inflict the
harm or suffering in question.  See, e.g., Avetova-Elisseva v. INS, 213 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir.
2000).
74. See, e.g., Zhang v. Ashcroft, No. 04-1384, 2005 WL 375726, at *4 (3d Cir. Dec. 17,
2005) (holding expulsion from school and near arrest do not constitute persecution); Hidayat
v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 04-1249, 2005 WL 1662139, at *1-2 (3d Cir. Jul. 27, 2005) (finding
that conduct when a Muslim mob attacked an applicant’s church, set it on fire, and beat him,
“though troubling, did not rise to the level of religious persecution”); Li v. Gonzales, No. 04-
3605, 2005 WL 1475649 (7th Cir. June 23, 2005) (holding Chinese officials did not persecute
an alien for his religious beliefs when they only harassed him while he rebuilt a church, and
never harmed, detained, or deprived him of his ability to earn a living, and where there was no
suggestion the government would harm him if the United States returned him to China); Tamayo
v. Ashcroft, No. 03-73955, 2005 WL 91612, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 18, 2005) (holding an applicant
for withholding of removal failed to establish past persecution when she described one incident
of militants throwing rocks at her church and a single attack on her husband and harassment of
her children); Panggabean v. Ashcroft, No. 04-70656, 2005 WL 81124 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 2005)
(holding disruption of weekly religious meetings held at alien’s residence did not rise to the
level of persecution where the alien testified that the government never physically assaulted her
on account of her religion); Ayad v. Ashcroft, No. 03-1079, 2004 WL 817381, at *3-4 (3d Cir.
Apr. 14, 2004) (noting that threats by themselves only constitute persecution “under exceptional
circumstances,” and holding that a cleric’s unwelcome proselytizing efforts in the alien’s home,
although offensive, rude, and even threatening, did not amount to persecution because the cleric
never physically injured the asylum applicant); Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d 384, 390 (6th
Cir. 1998) (holding that persecution “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal
harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or
significant deprivation of liberty”); Domingo v. INS, No. 96-1554, 1998 WL 24363, at *2 (4th
Cir. Jan. 26, 1998) (“Although the employment actions and pressure by one of Domingo’s
bosses for her to become a Muslim were objectionable, this type of discrimination does not
amount to persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.”); Bereza
v. INS, 115 F.3d 468, 472 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that persecution requires conduct amounting
to more than mere harassment); Kazlauskas v. INS, 46 F.3d 902, 904, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding harassment and ostracism from peers and teachers based on political and religious
beliefs and being denied admission to university on these bases does not rise to the level of
persecution). 
75. See, e.g., Krotova, 416 F.3d at 1084 (quoting Korablina, 158 F.3d at 1043) (finding
persecution and rejecting the Board’s finding of mere discrimination where anti-Semitic groups
violently assaulted alien three times, once at a synagogue and once with her nine-year-old
daughter; murdered a close family friend; and severely beat her brother); Mkrtchyan v.
Gonzales, No. 03-72461, 2005 WL 1541040, at *1-2  (9th Cir. July 1, 2005) (overruling the
immigration court in finding that the “combination of job loss, vandalism, confrontation with
a violent mob, harassment, detention, beatings, and threats of arrest compel a finding that the
harm rises to the level of persecution”); Sandhu v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71744, 2004 WL 2203937,
at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 27, 2004) (reversing the Board’s determination that the police’s rape of an
falling below this threshold, such as harassment or discrimination, is not
usually considered persecution,74 but may rise to the level of persecution if
sufficiently severe.75  Moreover, although persecution is usually associated
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alien, who called her a “Sikh whore” and “wife of a deserter,” did not rise to the level of
persecution); Baballah v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1067, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Kovac v.
INS, 407 F.2d 102, 107 (9th Cir. 1969)) (holding Israeli officials persecuted a Muslim Israeli
on account of his religion and ethnicity where the officials had thwarted his attempts to gain
employment as a lifeguard and accountant and where Israeli Marines “deliberately interfered
with his attempts to maintain a fishing business through the dangerous intimidation tactics”));
Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding persecution where police
repeatedly confronted an Iranian Christian at her home, forced her to the end of food rationing
lines, forced her to wear Muslim attire, and frequently harassed her at her church). 
76. Khup v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Thomas v. Ashcroft, 359
F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that escalating intimidation and a serious threat of
physical violence established persecution); Salazar-Paucar v. INS, 281 F.3d 1069, 1075 (9th
Cir. 2002) (holding death threats along with beatings of family members and murders of
political allies constitute persecution); Ernesto Navas v. INS, 217 F.3d 646, 658 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“[W]e have consistently held that death threats alone can constitute persecution.”).
77. See Baballah, 367 F.3d at 1075(holding that purely economic harm may amount to
persecution when there is “a probability of deliberate imposition of substantial economic
disadvantage upon [an alien] on account of a protected ground” (quoting Kovac, 407 F.2d at
107)); Borca v. INS, 77 F.3d 210, 215-17 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a test for persecution
requiring a complete withdrawal of all economic opportunities instead of a substantial
deprivation); Abdel-Masieh, 73 F.3d at 583 (“The harm or suffering need not be physical, but
may take other forms, such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the
deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials of life.” (quoting In re
Laipenieks, 18 I. & N. Dec. 433, 456-57 (B.I.A. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 750 F.2d 1427
(9th Cir. 1985))); see also Davis & Atchue, supra note 2, at 82 (noting the “failure of courts to
link persecution to non-physical forms of harm such as economic deprivation, incarceration,
harassment, and threats”).  Compare Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1092-95 (7th Cir.
2004) (holding than an alien’s loss of job and his economic hardship and harassment did not
rise to the level of persecution), with Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1340
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding employment discrimination suffered by Cuban resulting from troubles
with the Communist Party did not constitute persecution when the discrimination stopped short
of depriving the alien of the means to earn a living). 
78. See, e.g., Fisher v. INS, 61 F.3d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he concept of
persecution is broad enough to include measures that compel an individual to engage in
conduct that is not physically painful or harmful but is abhorrent to that individual’s deepest
beliefs.  An example of such conduct might be requiring a person to renounce his or her
religious beliefs or to desecrate an object of religious importance.” (alteration in original)
(quoting Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1242 (3d Cir. 1993))); Doe v. INS, 867 F.2d 285 (6th Cir.
1989).
with an alien suffering severe physical abuse, such as torture or beatings,
threats of harm may in some instances be sufficient to amount to persecution.76
Similarly, even if an alien suffers no physical abuse, pure economic harm may
also constitute persecution if it is sufficiently severe.77  Persecution may also
arise in the absence of violence where a government compels an individual to
renounce his or her religious beliefs or completely prohibits religious
practice.78
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79. Sumadatha v. Ashcroft, No. 03-3898, 2004 WL 2278706, at *1, *3 (3d Cir. Oct. 6,
2004); see also Ye v. Gonzales, No. 04-1740, 2005 WL 1153976, at *2 (3d Cir. May 17, 2005)
(holding a short detention including a “single slap and solitary kick” from the police was not
severe enough to constitute persecution). 
80. Liu v. Ashcroft, 380 F.3d 307, 310-11, 313 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Here, Mei Dan’s detention
was relatively short.  As physical brutality goes, hair-pulling and pushing rank on the less
serious end.”).
81. Vaduva v. INS, 131 F.3d 689, 690 (7th Cir. 1997).
82. Zhuang v. Gonzales, No. 04-73820, 2005 WL 2271597, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2005);
see also Quan v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 883, 888-89 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that officials had
persecuted an alien when they arrested and beat her with an electrically-charged baton and later
had her fired from her job because of her religious associations); Asani v. INS, 154 F.3d 719,
722-23 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that persecution probably occurred where officials detained
applicant for two weeks, beat him so that he lost two teeth, deprived him of food and water, and
kept him in a cell chained to a radiator, where he was unable to sit).  But see Singh v. INS, No.
01-71133, 2002 WL 465319, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 15, 2002) (stating that “[a]lthough troubling,
Singh’s treatment does not compel a finding of persecution,” where police imprisoned him for
twenty-four hours, slapped him, pulled his hair, punched his stomach, called him names and
ridiculed his religion, and two weeks later again detained him for two days in a dark room,
where they beat, slapped, and punched him and dragged him about by his hair); Zalega v. INS,
916 F.2d 1257, 1260 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that detention for short periods without
mistreatment and work-related harassment are not persecution).
83. See supra notes 43, 44, 54.  For an examination of how this requirement is interpreted
in the United States and in other common law countries, see Michelle Foster, Causation in
Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265
(2002).
Government detentions and interrogations are a recurring theme in claims
for asylum and withholding of removal, and courts typically consider the
severity of treatment and the duration of the detention in determining whether
to grant either form of relief, in addition to considering the other factors set
forth in Part III.  For example, an alien’s four-hour detention without beatings
or torture did not rise to the level of persecution,79 and a two-day detention
where police pulled an alien’s hair and pushed her to the ground was also not
sufficiently severe.80  In contrast, an asylum seeker’s single beating, resulting
in facial bruising and a broken finger, was severe enough to amount to
persecution,81 as was another alien’s arrest and fifteen-day detention, which
included two beatings.82
C. The “On Account” Requirement
Once an asylum or withholding applicant establishes that she has suffered
abuse rising to the level of persecution, the alien must then show that this
persecution or fear of future persecution is “on account” of one of the five
protected grounds.83  This element is central to this comment’s investigation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an alien’s persecution is “on account”
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84. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992); see also Diab v. Ashcroft, 397 F.3d
35, 40 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding persecution “on account” of religion exists where the applicant
can show he was “persecuted on the basis of his religion“). 
85. E.g., Li v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 500, 509 (5th Cir. 2005), vacated, 429 F.3d 1153 (5th
Cir. 2005) (“The federal courts and the BIA have also recognized that an alien may demonstrate
that a persecutor’s actions were on account of a protected characteristic even if the persecutor
had mixed motivations; a persecutor does not have to be motivated solely by the victim’s
possession of a protected characteristic.”); Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667 (5th Cir. 2002); In
re S— P—, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 491 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662
(B.I.A. 1988). 
86. See, e.g., Khanuja v. INS, Nos. 99-70510, 00-70599 2001 WL 337847, at *1 (9th Cir.
Apr. 4, 2001) (holding that asylum applicant failed to “demonstrate a nexus between the alleged
persecution and his religion”); Kalajian v. INS, No. 99-70151, 2000 WL 1015899, at *1 (9th
Cir. July 21, 2000) (finding insufficient evidence of a “nexus between his religion or ethnicity
and the alleged persecution”); see also Hughes, supra note 40, at 305.  Showing a nexus is
particularly significant when claims are premised on religious belief, and one commentator
cautions that a nexus test requiring detailed and extensive evidence of the relationship between
the persecution and one’s religion “poses a potentially insurmountable obstacle to protection,”
because religious-based persecution often results from multiple, complex factors occurring in
environments where it is difficult to distinguish between religious biases and other ethnic or
political motivations.  Musalo, supra note 28, at 205.
87. See, e.g., Desir v. Ilchert, 840 F.2d 723, 726 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Hernandez-Ortiz
v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 1985)).  Additionally, persecution can be “on account” even
where the victim does not actually possess the belief or characteristic attributed to him.  E.g.,
Gao v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he question in this case is not whether
Gao was or is a practitioner of Falun Gong, but whether authorities would have perceived him
as such or as a supporter of the movement because of his activities.  If authorities would
persecute him as an adherent or as a supporter of Falun Gong, then such persecution would be
‘on account of’ an enumerated ground.”). 
88. In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 662.
of a protected ground if the victim possesses a protected characteristic that
motivated the persecutor to harm her.84  Importantly, many courts hold that the
victim’s protected characteristic need not be the persecutor’s sole motivation,
but need only comprise part of the motivation for the persecution.85  Further,
some decisions interpret the “on account” language to require a “nexus”
between the alleged persecution and one of the five enumerated grounds.86  An
adequate nexus exists where the alien demonstrates that his actual or imputed
belief or status motivated the persecutor’s efforts to harm him,87 but the alien
need not show the persecutor’s exact motivation if he can produce evidence
that would make a reasonable person fear danger on account of a protected
ground.88  Again, this “on account” element is critical in determining whether
a foreign government has persecuted or legitimately prosecuted an asylum
applicant.  Having highlighted the general structure of asylum law by
examining the two chief legal protections available to an alien fleeing
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89. Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d
990, 995 (9th Cir. 1998) (following Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
90. Kaurr v. INS, No. 97-70678, 1998 WL 416112, at *3 (9th Cir. June 17, 1998).  
91. Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 323 (3d Cir. 2004).
92. See Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 549 (6th Cir. 2003).
93. Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir. 1992).  
94. See  Ou v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. 02-4904, 2005 WL 1349874, at *2 (2d Cir. June
8, 2005) (holding that the prosecution an alien faced in China for illegal departure did “not
present a situation where prosecution would amount to persecution”); Jiang v. U.S. Attorney
Gen., No. 04-15394, 2005 WL 1052604, at *8 (11th Cir. May 5, 2005) (holding that a
punishment for violating China’s emigration policy would amount “more to prosecution for
violating Chinese law than persecution on the basis of political opinion”); Atique v. Ashcroft,
No. 02-3283, 2003 WL 1961208, at *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 28, 2003) (holding that an alien facing
arrest for violation of a Bangladeshi law prohibiting unauthorized departures of military
personnel would not “fear persecution rather than mere prosecution”); Morgan-Flores v. INS,
persecution, this comment now turns to the crucial distinction between
persecution and prosecution.
III. The Framework for Distinguishing Between True Persecution and
Legitimate Prosecution
An examination of American asylum jurisprudence reveals that courts have
adopted a general framework for distinguishing legitimate prosecution from
actual persecution.  Part III presents this framework by first noting that courts
make clear that an alien’s legitimate prosecution, without more, is insufficient
for a grant of asylum or withholding.  This part then highlights the principal
exceptions to this rule and concludes by discussing the most common factors
the courts have looked to in determining when state prosecution has become
protected persecution.
A. Legitimate Prosecution Is Not Persecution
Courts uniformly recognize that a state’s prosecution of its citizens does not
automatically equate with persecution, and often explicitly articulate this, as
when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit underscored the
“distinction between legitimate criminal prosecution and persecution based
on a protected ground,”89 and noted that the two are “readily
distinguishable.”90  Similarly, the Third Circuit adhered to the same
“distinction between persecution and prosecution,”91 while the Seventh Circuit
recognized, in language recently adopted by the Sixth Circuit,92 “the
fundamental distinction between persecution on the one hand and the
prosecution of nonpolitical crimes on the other.”93  In fact, the federal circuit




No. 02-70638, 2003 WL 1793335, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2003) ( holding that the prosecution
of a Peruvian “constitute[d] legitimate prosecution and would not qualify as a form of
persecution”); Qudus v. INS, No. 297-2815, 1998 WL 60399, at *1 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 1998)
(holding that an alien’s fear of prosecution in Nigeria for selling social security cards “does not
suggest a well-founded fear of persecution”); Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 F.3d 460, 463 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that the violation of Iranian exit restrictions would “constitute prosecution, not
persecution”); Pinon-Maceo v. INS, No. 95-1925, 1996 WL 293158, at *1 (1st Cir. June 4,
1996) (holding that an alien who departed from Cuba illegally feared “possible prosecution, not
persecution”); Balguiti v. INS, 5 F.3d 1135, 1136 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding prosecution for
violation of Moroccan laws did not constitute persecution); Qasim v. INS, No. 90-2027, 1990
WL 209843, at *4 (4th Cir. Dec. 26, 1990) (holding that fear of prosecution under Bangladesh’s
currency exchange laws did not amount to fear of persecution).
95. See Carol A. Buckler, Outline of Asylum Law and Procedure, in 30TH ANNUAL
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION INSTITUTE 193, 203 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice,
Course Handbook Series No. 1021, 1997) (noting the “general presumption that prosecution
for a crime is not persecution”).
96. Lakaj v. Gonzales, No. 04-3998, 2005 WL 3113512, at *4 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2005); see
also Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[S]overeign nations have a recognized
right to investigate suspected enemies of the government.  Such investigation does not constitute
persecution . . . .” (citation omitted) (citing Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office for Immigration,
894 F.2d 1292, 1297, 1299 (11th Cir. 1990))). 
97. See Funes-Torres v. INS, No. 99-70283, 2000 WL 519121, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 27,
2000) (holding that a government “has the right to prosecute individuals accused of criminal
activity and that such prosecution is readily distinguishable from persecution” (quoting Blanco-
Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir. 1988))); Cynthia A. Isaacs, The Torch Dims: The
Ambiguity of Asylum and the “Well-Founded Fear of Persecution” Standard in Sadeghi v. INS,
20 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 721, 730 (1995) (“It is a well-settled tenet of international law
that the enforcement of the internal laws of a nation remains a sovereign right of that nation’s
government.”); Yoo, supra note 53, at 404.
98. See Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2004); Funes-Torres, 2000
WL 519121, at *2; Soric v. INS, 346 F.2d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 1965); In re Janus & Janek, 12 I.
& N. Dec. 866, 876 (1968); John D. Griffin, Comment, The Chinese Student Protection Act and
“Enhanced Consideration” for PRC Nationals: Legitimizing Foreign Policy While Averting
False Positives in Asylum Law, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 1105, 1134 (1995). 
Uniformly recognizing the fundamental separation between persecution and
prosecution, courts have adopted the general rule that the legitimate
prosecution of an alien cannot be persecution.95  The primary justification for
this rule is that the government of “every sovereign nation has a legitimate
interest in investigating criminal activity”96 and has the right to prosecute
individuals accused of criminal behavior.97  Therefore, aliens merely seeking
to avoid prosecution for common law crimes or for activities that would be
illegal under U.S. laws are ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.98
To illustrate, an alien who commits armed robbery cannot claim that the
government has persecuted him for his political views when authorities
investigate or prosecute him for the robbery, because his government “has a
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99. Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 1994). 
100. Gassama v. INS, No. 96-2004, 1997 WL 161692, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 1997); see also
Qasim v. INS, No. 90-2027, 1990 WL 209843, at *4 (4th Cir. Dec. 26, 1990) (“Fear of
prosecution for a criminal offense generally cannot support allegations of fear of persecution.”).
101. See Sequeira-Arauz v. INS, No. 95-70754, 1997 WL 51756, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 3,
1997) (“It is undisputed that legitimate government prosecution of criminal activity is not
ordinarily persecution . . . .”).
102. Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Office of the
U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Guidelines on International Protection No. 6:
Religion-Based Refugee Claims Under Article 1(A)(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 26, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/04/06 (Apr. 28, 2004)
[hereinafter Guidelines], available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/40d8427a4.pdf
(“Prosecution and punishment pursuant to a law of general application is not generally
considered to constitute persecution . . . .”). 
103. Qudus v. INS, No. 297-2815, 1998 WL 60399, at *3 (7th Cir. Feb. 10, 1998)
(“Prosecution for violation of laws of general applicability does not amount to
persecution . . . .”).
104. Chand v. INS, No. 92-70538,1994 WL 118026, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 5, 1994). 
105. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 991 (8th Cir. 2004). 
106. El Balguiti v. INS, 5 F.3d 1135, 1136 (8th Cir. 1993). 
107. Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1060 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Janusiak v. INS, 947 F.2d
46, 48 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also Shi Fei v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., No. 04-3407, 2005 WL
1140732, at *2 (3d Cir. May 16, 2005). 
legitimate bone to pick with him, regardless of any political views he may
hold.”99
Although courts recognize that mere “criminal prosecution does not in itself
constitute persecution,”100 they generally add the requirement that the law in
question be legitimate.101  Courts typically define this legitimacy in one of two
ways.  First, some courts have required that the law in question be generally
applicable to all citizens, an approach the Second Circuit adopted, stating that
“[p]unishment for violation of a generally applicable criminal law is not
persecution.”102  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit relied on this concept of
general applicability,103 as did the Ninth Circuit in holding that merely being
prosecuted under a law “applicable to all people in the country” is not
persecution.104  Instead of requiring general applicability, a second approach
is to define the legitimacy element as requiring that the home nation fairly
administer the law in question.  For instance, the Eighth Circuit held that
“[c]riminal prosecution for violation of a fairly administered law does not
constitute persecution,”105 and, accordingly, such legitimate prosecution
cannot constitute grounds for asylum.106  Further, the Third Circuit held that
“fear of prosecution for violations of ‘fairly administered’ laws does not
itself” make one eligible for asylum or withholding of removal.107  Irrespective
of the choice of terminology, however, a court will only determine that state
prosecution is not persecution if the underlying law is legitimate.
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Thus, the foundational principle in this area of law is that a country’s
prosecution of its citizens for violating the law cannot, by itself, constitute
persecution where the underlying law is legitimate.  Considering several clear
instances where courts have applied this principle to deny asylum or
withholding applicant refuge can be instructive.  According to the Ninth
Circuit, the following conduct constitutes legitimate state investigation or
prosecution, and therefore is not grounds for asylum or withholding of
removal: painting slogans on the walls of a Chinese building,108 illegal
departure from China,109 assaulting Chinese co-workers during a workplace
demonstration,110 deserting the military of El Salvador,111 vehicular homicide
in Fiji,112 a French faith healer’s alleged swindling,113 an Iranian’s selling
goods without a permit,114 an Iranian’s distribution of western films and
videos,115 violating the Iranian dress code,116 violating an Israeli curfew and
traveling without proper identification,117 illegally selling foreign currency on
the Nicaraguan black market,118 operating a business without a license and
illegally possessing U.S. currency in Nicaragua,119 defacing Nicaragua’s
government property,120 embezzling funds from one’s Nigerian employer,121
violating Romanian travel restrictions,122 possessing stolen weapons in
Romania,123 and committing fraud in Vietnam.124
These illustrations highlight the notion that Congress did not intend for
either asylum or withholding of removal to protect ordinary suspects or
criminals from prosecution in their home countries, and this remains true
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130. Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318, 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2004).
131. Although beyond the purview of this discussion, one should note that immigration law
does not deny an alien all recourse in the event a court determines he or she is ineligible for
asylum or withholding of removal.  An alien who has suffered torture at the hands of her
government may prevent deportation under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which
requires the alien to establish “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
removed to the proposed country of removal.”  Chhokar v. Gonzalez, No. 03-71599, 2005 WL
2108653, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 1, 2005) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2) (2005)); see also
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 3, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (“No State Party shall
regardless of whether the alien faces harsher penalties if deported back to his
homeland than he would if allowed to remain in the United States.125  Thus,
the Ninth Circuit denied asylum to an Iranian woman facing prosecution for
violating Iran’s generally applicable dress and conduct standards even though
the punishment she feared “may seem harsh by Western standards,”126 and the
identical rationale led the Second Circuit to deny the religious persecution
claim of a Yemeni citizen convicted of first degree manslaughter in an
American court, who, while incarcerated in an American prison, was
sentenced to death for the same offense by a sharia127 court in Yemen.128  The
Second Circuit admitted that “the Yemeni dispensation is foreign to American
laws and mores,” but found that nothing in asylum law required the
substitution of “domestic standards for those enforced under Yemeni law
nondiscriminatorily in accordance with the Moslem religion.”129 
Courts disregard these differing societal norms more frequently in the
investigatory phase of a prosecution, rather than in the sentencing phase.  For
instance, the Third Circuit refused to say that the government of Bangladesh
persecuted one of its citizens suspected of illegally possessing weapons and
explosives, when the government detained him at a police station for three
days, severely beat him with canes and kicks to the face, and coerced him into
signing a false confession, even though “[s]uch treatment is, to say the least,
extremely troubling.”130  Other courts have held that prosecution for ordinary
criminal behavior does not in itself constitute persecution131 no matter how
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must be at least fifty percent.  For an extensive examination of the Convention Against Torture,
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(citing Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001)); Berte v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 993,
996 (8th Cir. 2005); De Leon v. INS, No. 02-4148, 2004 WL 1088243, at *1 (6th Cir. May 12,
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detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, imprisonment, illegal searches, confiscation of
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(7th Cir. 2002))); Toptchev v. INS, 295 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mitev v. INS,
67 F.3d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1995)).
137. Tuhin v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2661, 2003 WL 1342995, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003). 
“deplorable” the police conduct,132 regardless of whether the conduct was
“unacceptable by United States standards,”133 and notwithstanding the severity
of punishment facing a deported alien.134  In order for law enforcement
activities to constitute persecution and thus warrant asylum or withholding of
removal, an alien must show something more than a harsher punishment.
B. The Exception - When Prosecution Becomes Persecution
Clearly, prosecution does not automatically amount to persecution, but in
certain instances prosecution will rise to the level of actual persecution.  As
noted above, courts often qualify the general rule that a state’s enforcement
of its laws does not equate with persecution with phrases such as, “criminal
prosecution does not, without more, establish persecution.”135  In other words,
courts recognize that prosecution may indeed “equate with” or “include”
persecution under certain circumstances,136 and that “[t]he two terms are not
mutually exclusive.”137  Therefore, the essential task is to determine the
precise circumstances transforming prosecution into persecution.  In general,
prosecution becomes persecution where the state action at issue amounts to a
mere pretext for actual persecution, and where prosecution proceeds from a
mixture of legitimate and non-legitimate governmental motives.
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1. Pretextual Prosecution
The primary exception to the rule distinguishing prosecution from
persecution arises where prosecutorial conduct cloaks a government’s intent
to persecute with the veneer of legitimacy, or where an alien fears punishment
“that is not legitimate, but instead masks an invidious motive” to persecute the
alien on account of her race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.138  Thus, it is error for an immigration
court to consider only the facial legitimacy of the government’s charges
against the asylum applicant.139  Instead, appellate panels uniformly require
the lower courts to rule that persecution has occurred when an improper
governmental motivation drives an otherwise facially legitimate prosecution
or punishment, which in reality stems from “one of the enumerated factors”
or “a nefarious purpose,”140 or where state action is “merely a pretext to
persecute”141 or is animated by “some improper government motive for
pursuing the matter.”142
Understandably, those fleeing persecution in their native lands are rarely
in a good position to gather physical evidence detailing the alleged
persecutor’s motivations.  Recognizing this dilemma, the U.S. Supreme Court
held in INS v. Elias-Zacarias that direct evidence of the persecutor’s motives
is not necessary.143  Instead, an alien must merely show “some evidence of it,
direct or circumstantial.”144  This issue arises most frequently in political
persecution claims, and importantly, the Court has held that the existence of
a generalized “political” motive underlying the persecutor’s actions is
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concerning the Sandinista government and he said further, that since he arrived in the United
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here,” and was unable to show that the Sandinistas had any knowledge of his political opinion.
Id. at 702-03.
overcome a political belief held by the victim.146  Asylum applicants
frequently fail to meet this requirement when they cannot show sufficient
proof that their home government knew of their political or religious beliefs.
For instance, the Iranian government arrested, interrogated, and detained
Saideh Fisher for several hours when she illegally observed a male in a
bathing suit.147  Later, officials stopped and admonished her because she had
inadvertently allowed a few pieces of hair to hang out of her chador, or veil.148
The Ninth Circuit rejected Fisher’s claim that the government persecuted her
for her political and religious beliefs, for although she strongly disapproved
of the Khomeini regime’s treatment of Iranian women, neither incident
“indicates that government officials knew of her political or religious beliefs
or punished her on account of them.”149
The same barrier confronted Francisco Elias Gomez-Mejia, a Nicaraguan
soldier.  After accusing him of failing to properly perform his duties, Gomez-
Mejia’s military superiors incarcerated him, almost naked, for several days in
an unheated cell during cold weather and forced him to sleep on the cell’s
pavement.150  After deserting the army, Gomez-Mejia sought asylum in the
United States, claiming that his superiors had persecuted him for his political
beliefs which questioned the Sandinista government.151  The Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument because “Gomez-Mejia’s political opinion was never
revealed to the Sandinistas.”152  Thus, in order to claim that government
investigation or prosecution is merely a pretext for persecution on account of
an alien’s religious or political beliefs, that asylum or withholding applicant
must present some quantum of evidence that the offending government knew
of those opinions.
Even where an alien has shown the pretextual nature of the government’s
prosecutorial activities, finding an improper motive is only the first step in a
two-step inquiry.  As Part II revealed, courts require that an asylum applicant
show he endured severe harm or suffering, for persecution is “an extreme
concept that does not include every sort of treatment our society regards as
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offensive.”153  Thus, if one of the five enumerated factors motivates a criminal
prosecution and if the punishment under the law is sufficiently serious to
amount to persecution, then prosecution under a criminal law of general
applicability can justify granting asylum or withholding of removal.154  This
combination of an improper governmental motive and severe mistreatment of
the alien constitutes the most frequently applied exception to the general rule
that prosecution is distinct from persecution.155
Demonstrating the severity of an alien’s treatment is crucially important in
prevailing under this exception, because no matter how invidious the
government’s motivation, a court will consider the state’s behavior merely
harassment, and not persecution, unless the conduct in question is truly
extreme.  Courts variously describe the requisite severity of the government’s
behavior as “excessive or arbitrary,”156 “especially unconscionable,”157
“sufficiently severe,”158 or “disproportionately severe.”159  The Ninth Circuit
has found improperly motivated prosecution to be sufficiently unconscionable
to warrant asylum or withholding of removal in a variety of circumstances.
Persecution existed, for example, where Indian police shot an alien in the leg
and beat him so severely that he could not walk for two weeks,160 and in
another similar episode, persecution was found when Indian police brutally
tortured an alien, forcibly stretching his legs to a 180 degree position in order
to tear his leg and groin muscles, all the while taunting the alien’s political
beliefs.161  Likewise, a court granted a Senegalese citizen asylum after two
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arrests and detentions under extremely poor conditions, where officials
accused him of supporting secessionists and threatened him with death.162
This type of brutality during criminal investigations occurs frequently in
asylum law, but aliens may also demonstrate their persecution by showing that
they have been or will be improperly convicted or sentenced.  For instance, a
Fijian demonstrated persecution through a potential arrest, court-martial, and
trial for treason,163 as did a Filipino, upon showing illegitimate criminal
charges involving misappropriation of funds.164
Therefore, the first exception to the rule separating prosecution from
persecution requires an improper governmental motivation stemming from a
protected ground and egregious prosecutorial conduct resulting from that
improper purpose.  To illustrate the pretextual motive exception, the
discussion will now turn toward Iran and China.
a) Bandari v. INS
Andaranik Bandari was a Christian who met a Muslim girl named Afsaneh
while attending high school in his native country of Iran.165  They lived across
the street from each other in Tehran, but for the first year of their
acquaintance, they “just stared at each other.”166  Eventually they began to
meet secretly, for although Bandari knew that interfaith dating was illegal, he
stated that “I loved her very much and I wanted to get acquainted with her.”167
Bandari and Afsaneh continued their clandestine relationship, but one
evening, as the two embraced in the street, three uniformed police officers
approached the couple and handcuffed Bandari, informing him that he had
violated a law banning public displays of affection.168  When the officers
discovered that Bandari was a Christian and Afsaneh was a Muslim, they
called Bandari a “dirty Armenian” with “no right to go out with a Persian girl”
and struck him so hard that he collapsed to the ground.169  When he tried to
protect his face, the officers continued beating and kicking him all over his
body.170  After the police took Bandari to the station, they whipped him with
a rubber hose before throwing him into solitary confinement.171  For the next
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four days the police demanded that Bandari confess to raping Afsaneh.172  He
refused to confess, and each refusal was accompanied with further torture that
was so intense he lost consciousness on several occasions.173  After five days
of this treatment, a judge informed Bandari that he had violated the
Ayatollah’s edict prohibiting interfaith dating and marriage, and that he must
convert to Islam or face punishment.174  Bandari refused to convert, and,
according to Bandari, the judge informed him that his punishment would be
“making me stand underneath a wall and being thrown rocks on me until
death.”175  The judge actually imposed a lesser sentence in light of the
Bandari’s youth — seventy-five lashes and a year in prison.176  
Before the sentence was carried out, Bandari’s grandfather bribed a
government official to release his grandson, and Bandari spent the next three
weeks in bed recovering from his wounds.177  Shortly after his recovery,
Bandari went for a walk where two police officers recognized him and began
to beat him, while yelling “[y]ou raper [sic] of Moslem girl.  You bastard
Armenian.  Leave and go and live in your Christian country.”178  Fearing for
his life, Bandari fled Iran on foot and made his way to Turkey, where his
grandfather informed him that the state had officially charged him with raping
Afsaneh and that he must stay out of Iran.179  He arrived in the United States
on August 29, 1994, on a one-year tourist visa,180 and in April of 1996,
Bandari applied for asylum, telling the immigration judge at the hearing, “[I]f
I go back, they’ll kill me.”181
The immigration judge denied Bandari’s asylum claim because his was “a
case of prosecution and not persecution,” for “any man, whether Christian or
Muslim who was caught openly kissing a woman in Tehran would have been
subjected to the same type of treatment as the respondent.”182  The Board of
Immigration Appeals affirmed the ruling and held that the evidence showed
that the Iranian government had merely prosecuted Bandari for violating a
neutral law prohibiting embracing in public, and had not persecuted him on
account of a protected ground.183
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193. Id.  Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution now grants citizens the right of religious
freedom:  “Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.  No
state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe
in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in,
any religion.”  XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 36 (1982) (P.R.C.), translated in THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Pergamon Press 1983); see also Christopher Chaney,
Comment, The Despotic State Department in Refugee Law: Creating Legal Fictions to Support
Falun Gong Asylum Claims, 6 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 130, 150 (2005).  In reality, however,
religious practice is restricted to places of worship sanctioned and registered by the government,
The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning in Bandari v. INS.184  The court
first acknowledged the general rule that legitimate criminal prosecution is
distinct from persecution,185 but then held that Bandari had clearly suffered
persecution at the hands of the Iranian government.186  Although the police’s
initial stop was perhaps legitimate law enforcement, the subsequent beatings,
torture, detention and sentencing of Bandari was not legitimate prosecution for
violating a neutral law against embracing in public.  Instead, such acts
constituted religious persecution for violating an edict prohibiting members
of different religions from commingling.187  Thus, Bandari exemplifies the
pretextual motive exception because the Ninth Circuit granted asylum and
withholding of removal,188 after finding that (1) Iran had an improper
motivation for prosecuting Bandari and (2) the government’s treatment of
Bandari was truly egregious.189  
b) Guo v. Ashcroft
Fundamentalist countries such as Iran offer clear instances of state-
sponsored religious persecution, but secular governments are equally capable
of persecuting the faithful, as demonstrated in Guo v. Ashcroft.190  Jian Gou
became a Christian in 1998 and was baptized the following year by his
Chinese pastor, Wang Kefei.191  Several months after Gou’s baptism, Chinese
police interrupted a religious gathering at Pastor Kefei’s home and arrested
Gou and other members of the congregation for participating in an illegal
religious gathering.192  Police took Gou to the station, where they detained him
for one and a half days while pressuring him to confess to committing a
crime.193  When he refused, telling his interrogators that “it is my freedom to
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believe in Christianity,” the officers struck Gou twice in the face and ordered
him to perform pushups until he could no longer stand it.194  While Gou did
this, the officers kicked him in the stomach and told him that this abuse would
continue unless he signed an affidavit promising not “to believe in such a[n]
evil religion.”195  Gou signed the paper to stop the abuse.196  A few days later,
the police approached Gou and several other congregants who had gathered
at the tomb of a fellow church member.197  When an officer attempted to
remove a cross from the tomb, Gou pushed him to prevent the cross’s
removal.198  The officer quickly subdued Gou with an electric baton and held
him while the police kicked his legs, causing him to fall to the ground.199
Once at the police station, the officer Gou had pushed struck him repeatedly
in the face, and during his fifteen-day detention, the police tied Gou to a chair
and beat him with a plastic pole.200  Upon his release, Gou discovered that his
employers had fired him “[b]ecause they say I commit a crime,” and he was
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205. Id. at 1197.  The BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision based on the latter’s
finding that Mr. Gou was not a credible witness.  Id. at 1199.  The Ninth Circuit rejected this
finding of adverse credibility and analyzed the immigration judge’s alternative finding that, even
assuming Gou was credible, his treatment consisted merely of initial harassment followed by
legitimate criminal prosecution.  Id. at 1202.
206. Id. at 1203.
207. Id.
208. Id. (quoting Chand v. INS, 222 F.3d 1066, 1077 (2000).
209. Id. 
210. Id. at 1204.
211. Id. 
learned that Chinese officials had arrested Pastor Kefei and were aware of his
flight.202
Gou applied for asylum and withholding of removal to escape further
mistreatment from the Chinese government,203 but the immigration judge
denied his request because his first arrest was merely harassment that did not
rise to the level of persecution, and his second arrest was legitimate
prosecution resulting solely from Gou’s altercation with a Chinese police
officer.204  The Board of Immigration of Appeals affirmed this ruling.205
The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding instead that Gou’s first arrest
constituted persecution because the state’s mistreatment of him was greater
than mere harassment and was inflicted on account of Gou’s religious
beliefs.206  Similarly, Gou’s second arrest and beatings comprised religious
persecution and not a legitimate prosecution for hitting a police officer.207  The
court criticized the immigration judge for superficially focusing on the
criminality of Gou’s assault on the officer, noting precedent that “resistance
to discriminatory government action that results in persecution is persecution
on account of a protected ground.”208  Mirroring the analysis in Bandari, the
Gou court held that Gou adequately demonstrated past persecution because (1)
the Chinese government’s beating and detaining him for fifteen days “rises to
the level of persecution” and (2) because one of the five protected grounds for
establishing refugee status clearly motivated the treatment.209  In short, the
Chinese government had not prosecuted Gou under a generally applicable law
against striking police officers, but had persecuted Gou for his religious
beliefs.  This finding of past persecution created a presumption that Gou had
a well-founded fear of future religious persecution if deported to China, which
then shifted the burden to the INS to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that conditions in China had improved sufficiently to make Gou’s fear
unreasonable.210  The court remanded the case for this inquiry.211
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c) Lin v. INS
Immigration judges and federal appeals courts frequently hear asylum
claims alleging prosecutions stemming from improper political motivations in
addition to the religious motives seen in Bandari and Gou.  One such example
is Li Wu Lin v. INS.212  Li Wu Lin was a fifteen-year-old middle school student
who joined the student demonstrations leading up to the Tiananmen Square
massacre.213  From May 18 through June 2, 1989, Lin participated in four
marches to protest the Chinese government’s corruption, antidemocratic rule,
and disregard for human rights.214  Lin was a leader in these protests and often
marched at the front of the demonstrations, holding signs calling for greater
freedom in China.215  During one of these marches, the protestors attempted
to push through a police barricade in order to occupy a government building,
but the police and soldiers used electric batons to beat the protestors away
from the building.216  On June 4, 1989, Chinese soldiers used automatic
weapons and tanks to kill hundreds of demonstrators in Beijing, abruptly
terminating the student protest movement.217  Six days after what became
known as the Tiananmen Square massacre, two police officers and their
superior arrived at Lin’s home and presented his mother with a subpoena
demanding that Lin immediately appear for interrogation before the Public
Security Bureau.218  The police told Lin’s mother that they would arrest and
strictly punish her son if they apprehended him, so she refused their demands
to disclose his whereabouts.219  When Lin learned the authorities were looking
for him, he fled to his aunt’s house and spent the next two-and-a-half years in
hiding while he waited for his family to earn enough money to smuggle him
out of the country.220  While Lin was in hiding, Chinese officials visited his
home on five separate occasions and once detained and threatened his mother
for refusing to disclose Lin’s location.221 Also during this time, police arrested,
beat, and sentenced several of Lin’s classmates to over one year of detention
and forced labor for their part in protesting the government.222
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Eventually smuggled out of China, Lin traveled through Singapore and
Czechoslovakia before arriving in the United States in October of 1992.223  In
spite of his compelling story, the immigration judge and the Board of
Immigration Appeals denied his request for asylum and withholding of
removal.224  Their logic was simple: because Lin admitted that he attempted
to occupy a government building during one of the pro-democracy
demonstrations, China’s efforts to apprehend and punish Lin “merely showed
that the Chinese government was interested in enforcing a neutral law of
general applicability” that prohibited trespass on government property.225
On appeal, the Third Circuit began its analysis by recalling that prosecution
under a law of general applicability amounts to persecution where an
enumerated factor motivates the prosecution and where the punishment is
sufficiently serious.226  Applying this pretextual motive exception, the court
adamantly rejected the notion that Lin’s treatment was a legitimate
prosecution for trespass, especially in light of his subpoena following a mere
six days after the Tiananmen Square massacre.  The court stated:
It is difficult to believe that in the wake of political repression on
that scale that the government was acting as a disinterested
enforcer of neutral laws . . . . We do not understand why the
government would send two police officers and a brigade leader if
it did not believe more was at stake than a fifteen-year old’s
trespass.  Nor does it make sense that if simple trespass was at
issue, the police would return five more times over the course of
the next year and a half.  That is a long time to pursue a middle-
school student’s trespass. . . . Nor is it very plausible that the
government would subject Lin’s classmates to the punishment they
received if trespassing was foremost on the government’s mind.227
The court believed that the police targeted Lin for expressing his political
beliefs, and not simply for violating a neutral law against trespassing.228
Having found that an improper purpose of overcoming a protected
characteristic motivated the Chinese government, the court next considered
whether Lin’s treatment was severe enough to constitute persecution.  The
court rejected the argument advanced by the INS that a year and a half of
incarceration and forced labor for a fifteen-year-old was not sufficiently
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severe punishment.229  Rather, this “very long sentence for simply voicing
opposition to the government” rose to the level of persecution.230  Because
China would punish Lin for his political beliefs, the court granted Lin asylum
and withholding of removal.231  
Bandari, Gou, and Li Wu Lin illustrate a general pattern in case of
“pretextual” prosecution.  First, an immigration judge denies an alien refuge,
purportedly applying the general rule that an alien’s prosecution under a
generally applicable law is not persecution.  Then a court of appeals reverses
the lower immigration court, viewing the government’s prosecution as a mask
for invidious persecution where the alien’s treatment is sufficiently egregious
to merit asylum or withholding.  Beyond this pretextual exception to the rule
that prosecution is not generally persecution, courts often encounter a related
scenario in which a government’s prosecution is motivated by both legitimate
and invidious motives.  This comment now turns to the “mixed-motive”
analysis some circuits apply in these circumstances. 
2. The Mixed-Motive Analysis
The “on account” element in persecution cases is critical to fairly
adjudicating asylum and withholding claims,232 but the Refugee Convention
and the documents interpreting that instrument do not provide meaningful
guidance to courts on this requirement.233  This lack of clarity may elicit little
concern when prosecutorial actions are blatantly pretextual, such as the
Bandari arrest for illegally embracing in public.  In the majority of asylum
applications, however, a foreign government has an arguably legitimate
motive to prosecute an alien in addition to the alleged improper motive, for
persecutors are rarely, if ever, motivated by a single improper purpose.234  The
1980 Refugee Act’s legislative history reveals that Congress rejected a rigid
“on account” test in favor of a more flexible standard that comports with the
broader humanitarian values Congress intended the Act to promote.235  Thus,
courts should not unrealistically interpret the “on account” element to require
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70678, 1998 WL 416112, at *3 (9th Cir. June 17, 1998). 
241. Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting also that “the conclusion that
a cause of persecution is economic does not necessarily imply that there cannot exist other
causes of the persecution”). 
242. Singh, 406 F.3d at 198, 200.
a single, true motivation underlying a government’s action.236  Rather, courts
should hold that an alien is eligible for protection so long as one of the
government’s motives was improper.237
Many circuits adopt this type of “mixed-motive analysis,” under which an
asylum or withholding applicant need not prove that the treatment she endured
resulted solely because of one of the five enumerated grounds.238  Instead, she
need demonstrate only that her treatment resulted, at least in part, from one of
the protected characteristics.239  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
“persecutory conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one
motive is one of the statutorily enumerated grounds,” asylum and withholding
grants are appropriate.240  The Second Circuit similarly holds that persecution
may arise from both protected and unprotected motives, for the “plain
meaning of the phrase ‘persecution on account of the victim’s political
opinion,’ does not mean persecution solely on account of the victim’s political
opinion.”241
The Third Circuit has offered two clear applications of the mixed-motive
analysis.  First, a native of India established eligibility for asylum where his
prosecution stemmed in part from the police imputing his father’s political
opinion to him, notwithstanding that the government had a legitimate security
interest in accusing him of possessing stolen weapons.242  Secondly, the leader
of a Chinese scientific delegation to the United States feared criminal
consequences for failing to report to the Chinese Embassy his suspicions that
several members of his delegation were contemplating defecting to the United
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some support in Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 959-63 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that persecution
on account of political opinion cannot be established where the alleged persecutor is unaware
that the victim holds the political opinion in question), and Gomez-Mejia v. INS, 56 F.3d 700,
701 (5th Cir. 1995).  The Chang majority confronted Alito’s objection:  
[On] the contrary, the evidence compels a reasonable fact finder to conclude that
Chang has “manifested” opposition to the Chinese government.  His actions in
defying the orders of the Chinese government because he disagreed with how they
would treat those suspected of trying to defect did exactly that.  Simply because
he did not call himself a dissident or couch his resistance in terms of a particular
ideology renders his opposition no less political.
Chang, 119 F.3d at 1063.
245. Ratnam, 154 F.3d at 996; see also Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2004);
Singh v. Ilchert, No. 98-16549, 1999 WL 519002 (9th Cir. Jul. 20, 1999); Singh v. Ilchert, 69
F.3d 375, 379 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The government asserts that Singh was not tortured on
account of his political opinion because . . . the real motive of the police was to gather
information about the Sikh separatists.  While that may have been one motive . . . at least in the
first incident, the police beat Singh because they did not believe him when he told them he was
not a separatist.”). 
States, where Chinese law required such reporting.243  The INS argued that the
delegation leader did not deserve refuge because China’s legitimate concerns
of protecting confidential state information would motivate any future
prosecution.  The appellate court reversed, granting the alien asylum and
withholding of removal, because even if China had a legitimate motivation of
protecting state secrets, the alien’s opposition to official policy would at least
partially motivate the prosecution.244
Ninth Circuit jurisprudence also illuminates the application of the mixed-
motive analysis.  In Ratnam v. INS, the court rejected the argument that a Sri
Lanka native’s torture, conducted for intelligence gathering purposes to
combat terrorist activity, did not constitute persecution when the alien’s
imputed political opinions at least partially motivated the government’s
conduct.245  Additionally, a court granted asylum and withholding of removal
to a Guatemalan who feared punishment for deserting the Guatemalan army,
for although “the BIA suggests that Guinac merely fears prosecution for his
desertion,” the alien’s superior officers frequently beat and insulted him on
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looting, destroying property, and carrying a weapon leveled against citizen of Bangladesh might
have been legitimate, his subsequent beatings from the police because of political beliefs were
not.  Id. 
251. See infra notes 408-37 and accompanying text.
account of his race and would impose a disproportionately severe punishment
for his desertion on account of his minority racial status.246
A corollary to this mixed-motive approach is the scenario where the alleged
persecution begins in a law enforcement effort with objectively pure
motivations.  Such an instance mirrors Bandari, where the Iranian police were
initially unaware of Bandari’s minority ethnicity and religious views and
arrested him solely because he violated a neutral law against embracing in
public.247  Such benign beginnings will not shield subsequent state action
when its motives improperly evolve once the government discovers an alien’s
protected characteristic.  As the Bandari court noted, “[t]hat the police
initially approached Bandari to enforce a neutral law does not affect our
holding,” because authorities later attacked him for his religious beliefs, and
asylum applicants need only present evidence that the government inflicted
harm in part because of a protected characteristic.248  Similarly, the court in
Blanco-Lopez v. INS found it irrelevant that the asylum applicant’s conflict
with the Salvadoran government may have been “instigated in the first
instance through a personal dispute” involving non-protected grounds, for it
soon developed into a situation where the government attempted to persecute
him for his political beliefs.249  Other courts addressing this issue agree with
these holdings that the mixed-motive analysis applies irrespective of the
possibly legitimate origins of the prosecution in question.250
In sum, the mixed-motive analysis bears fundamental importance in
correctly adjudicating asylum or withholding claims when both legitimate and
illegitimate objectives motivate a government’s persecutory conduct.
Although the foregoing cases may suggest the uniform adoption of this
approach, several circuits refuse to apply that analysis.251 This refusal is
discussed more fully in Part V. 
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C. Three Influential Factors
The central inquiry in determining if prosecution equals persecution is
whether the governmental conduct stems from an improper motivation.  Three
factors stand out as the most influential guides in evaluating whether the
government has an invidious motivation that transforms legitimate prosecution
into persecution: (1) the judicial process received by the alien, (2) the nature
of the underlying law the state is enforcing, and (3) the context in which the
prosecution occurs.  Although not the only factors relied on, these are the most
prominently applied, and they often prove crucial in the disposition of an
asylum applicant’s case.
1. The Level of Judicial Process Accompanying Prosecution
The most influential consideration informing a court’s decision is the level
of meaningful judicial process the asylum applicant received.  This concept
encompasses (1) the judicial process accompanying the investigation or trial
stages of prosecution, (2) the initiation of formal adversarial proceedings, (3)
whether a state has a legitimate prosecutorial purpose, (4) whether punishment
is extra-judicial, and (5) the evidence of the alien’s culpability.
a) Judicial Process at the Investigation and Trial Stage 
Courts are more likely to view prosecution as legitimate if the government
has or will give the alien meaningful judicial process during the investigatory
or adjudicatory phases of a prosecution.  Conversely, a lack of due process at
these points suggests that the prosecution may be a facade for persecution on
account of a protected ground.  For instance, the Ninth Circuit denied an
Indian’s claim for withholding of removal where authorities arrested the alien
pursuant to a warrant, allowed the assistance of counsel, and where “some
type of legitimate legal process occurred after the 1997 arrest.”252  Elsewhere,
that circuit found persuasive the fact that a Filipino had not shown that he
would “receive anything less than a fair trial” or that the government would
subject him to unwarranted punishment.253  Similarly, the Eighth Circuit
denied asylum and withholding to a Kenyan, in part because he had not
produced evidence that the criminal charges he faced would result in an unfair
trial.254  Further, the Third Circuit determined that a citizen of Bangladesh was
not eligible for asylum or withholding where he could not show that he would
be “unable to receive fair adjudication and punishment.  In fact, even his own
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severely beat an Indian alien without charging him with a crime contributed to the finding that
his detention lacked a legitimate purpose); Kaurr, 1998 WL 416112, at *3 (citing Blanco-Lopez,
858 F.2d at 534) (acknowledging the general rule that governments have “the right to prosecute
individuals accused of criminal activity and that such prosecution is readily distinguishable from
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b) The Initiation of Formal Proceedings
Courts also consider whether adequate fairness or due process accompanies
earlier stages in the prosecution, and find particularly relevant the absence of
the initiation of formal proceedings against the asylum claimant.  For instance,
Blanco-Lopez v. INS contemplated the Salvadoran government’s apprehension
of a fisherman to investigate possible drug running.256  The Ninth Circuit
rejected the argument that because the government had the right to prosecute
suspected criminals, the fisherman could not show persecution for his political
belief.257  The court concluded that the state persecuted the fisherman
primarily because no “actual, legitimate, criminal prosecution was initiated
against Blanco-Lopez” and that state security forces would possibly kill the
fisherman “without undertaking ‘any formal prosecutorial measures’” if the
United States deported him back to El Salvador.258  Thus, Blanco-Lopez stands
for the rule that when a government punishes a citizen without undertaking
any formal prosecutorial measures, the police activity is not legitimate
criminal investigation or prosecution, but rather government-inflicted
persecution based on a protected characteristic.259
Although the Ninth Circuit has found highly persuasive the fact that an
“actual, legitimate, criminal prosecution” was or was not formally initiated,260
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261. Ozdemir v. INS, 46 F.3d 6, 7 (5th Cir. 1994).
262. Id. at 8.  While the Ozdemir facts may have supported the conclusion that the alien was
merely the target of antiterrorist activity unrelated to his political or ethnic status, the court
ignored the lack of formal proceedings where similar facts would have suggested persecutory
motives in other circuits.  
263. Kyambadde v. INS, No. 91-9595, 1992 WL 158087, at *1-2 (10th Cir. July 6, 1992).
Further, the Eleventh Circuit offered a curious decision which declined to follow the Ninth
Circuit and oppositely concluded that the absence of formal charges militated against finding
persecution instead of in favor of that determination.  Kroi v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 04-
12709, 2005 WL 1523509 (11th Cir. June 29, 2005).
264. See Singh v. INS, No. 00-70296, 2002 WL 1033562, at *1 (9th Cir. May 22, 2002)
(“Extrajudicial beatings on account of political activity do not constitute a technique in
furtherance of a legitimate prosecutorial purpose.”); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 995-96 (9th
Cir. 1998) (rejecting “the argument that extraprosecutorial torture, if conducted for intelligence
gathering purposes, does not constitute persecution”).  Presumably, these holdings would also
apply to the extra-judicial murder in Kyambadde.
decisions from other circuits appear less concerned about the initiation of
formal proceedings.  For example, the Fifth Circuit dismissed an asylum
applicant’s appeal where Turkish officials arrested the applicant after
participating in a Kurdish antigovernment demonstration, detained him for
three days where they beat him on the soles of his feet, and on two later
occasions interrogated him for alleged participation in terrorist activity.261
The court found that the police had engaged in legitimate law enforcement
activity, in spite of the fact that the Turkish government never filed charges
against the alien.262  Similarly, in Kyambadde v. INS, the Tenth Circuit held
that an official in Uganda’s Obote regime who was arrested by Okella forces
the day after an Okella-led military coup toppled the Obote regime, and who
“has been neither seen nor heard from since,” was possibly the subject of
legitimate prosecution for crimes he may have committed under the prior
government.263  The Kyambadde court ignored the tendency of many courts,
especially in the Ninth Circuit, to construe the absence of formal charges as
a strong indication of persecution.264  Hence, the existence or lack of criminal
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presumption that the motive for harassment is political” (omission in original) (quoting
Hernandez-Ortiz v. INS, 777 F.2d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 1985))).
charges or formal proceedings clearly represents an important factor for many
courts, but by no means all.
c) The Prosecution’s Purpose
Even among courts that look to whether a state has initiated formal
proceedings, an affirmative answer is not necessarily dispositive.  The Ninth
Circuit confirmed that no single factor is conclusive in determining a
prosecution’s legitimacy, and noted that it “certainly ha[d] never held that if
police don’t charge someone with a crime this will automatically raise a
presumption of political persecution.”265  Rather, the essential question is
whether the purported criminal investigation lacked a “bona fide objective”
so that persecution must have been the true motivation for it.266  Accordingly,
while formality is often an important indicator of a prosecution’s legitimacy,
determining the overall purpose animating the state’s behavior should be the
central focus, and several courts hold that if an alien’s treatment is not shown
to have been undertaken pursuant to a legitimate governmental purpose, a
presumption automatically exists that the alien suffered persecution.267
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268. Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).  The court compared the
alien’s treatment with that of an American suspected of treasons: “No United States citizen is
punished for treason without a formal charge, and the opportunity for a full trial and appeal.
Mr. Dwomoh has no such protections; he might be executed without ever having been charged,
no less tried.”  Id. 
269. Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1165-68 (9th Cir. 2000). 
270. Ramirez Rivas v. INS, 899 F.2d 864, 868 (9th Cir. 1990).  For further discussion of the
Ramirez Rivas case, see Isaacs, supra note 97, at 731-32.
271. Singh v. Ilchert, 801 F. Supp. 313, 319 (9th Cir. 1992).
272. Funes-Torres v. INS, No. 99-70283, 2000 WL 519121, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 27, 2000)
(citing Ramirez Rivas, 899 F.2d at 867); see also Herandez-Ortiz, 777 F.2d at 516.
273. See Mabugat v. INS, 937 F.2d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1991) (questioning whether the
temporary diversion of funds from a cooperating employer for political purposes constitutes the
crime of “estafa” in the Philippines); see also Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143, 1145 (5th
d) The Prospect of Extra-judicial Punishment
Complementing the due process inquiry, courts are more likely to regard
prosecution as a mask for persecution where the state has or will inflict unfair
or extra-judicial punishment.  In one case, an appeals court determined a
Ghanaian eligible for asylum where the lower courts did not inquire if he
would enjoy due process protections or be the victim of arbitrary punishment
for treason.268  For the same reason, an Iranian citizen’s prosecution for
illegally distributing Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses qualified for
asylum because he would not receive a fair trial in Iran and the government
would probably summarily execute him.269  Similarly, this fact was relevant
to a Salvadoran’s asylum and withholding claim that the government punished
guerrillas without any due process, “excessively punishing the guilty and
sweeping in the innocent as well.”270  Case law therefore distinguishes
between prosecution that imposes punishment “without any judicial process”
and legitimate police efforts to arrest and prosecute those suspected of
criminal conduct.271
e) Evidence of the Alien’s Culpability
Several courts also consider the amount of evidence indicating that the
asylum applicant actually committed the crime in question in determining
whether her prosecution was legitimate, and a high likelihood of innocence
often suggests the impropriety of the prosecutor’s motivation.  The Ninth
Circuit generally holds that where a government prosecutes an alien with “no
reason to believe that he has engaged in any criminal activity,” a presumption
arises that an improper purpose motivated the prosecution.272  The application
of this presumption has led courts to ask if the foreign government technically
classifies the offense at issue as a crime,273 but more commonly, appellate
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Cir. 1994) (accepting as a “reasonable inference” that an Iranian’s counseling a student not to
fight in the Iraqi war was actually classified as a crime, and disregarding the dissent’s finding
that “[t]here has been no evidence produced [to] support [such an] assumption[]”).  
274. See Mabugat, 937 F.2d at 431.
275. Id.
276. Funes-Torres, 2000 WL 519121, at *2.
277. Abramov v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71856, 2004 WL 2411254, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2004).
278. Tadeo v. INS, No. 94-70643, 1996 WL 207141, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 26, 1996); see also
Sauvage v. INS, No. 97-71189, 1999 WL 966479, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 1999) (rejecting the
lower court’s conclusion that French authorities provided insufficient evidence to establish that
a French faith-healer was guilty of fraud). 
279. Adam v. Gonzales, No. 04-60080, 2005 WL 3178205 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2005).
courts assume the offense is “on the books,” and inquire whether the alien
committed that crime.
The Ninth Circuit often delves into the facts surrounding the alien’s
potential culpability, whether to evaluate the alien’s innocence or guilt in
order to apply the above presumption, or simply as another factor in
determining the legitimacy of the prosecution.  Illustrating this, one decision
concluded that the alien probably did not commit the crime with which his
home government charged him.274  In deciding this, the court evaluated the
alien’s mens rea, his intent to permanently deprive, and whether he engaged
in a non-consensual taking, “all of which presumably are necessary to
convict,” as well as several potential defenses the alien might raise.275  Similar
decisions have scrutinized the underlying basis for the charges, determining
that there was “no basis for concluding that [an alien] was involved” in
illegally funneling money to guerrillas,276 and holding that another alien was
“subjected to groundless prosecution for rape.”277
Other courts hesitate to substitute their assessment of an alien’s guilt or
innocence for that of a foreign trier of fact, as shown by one court’s refusal to
consider an alien’s culpability:
We intimate no opinion on whether [the asylum applicant] is guilty
of any of the charges which he fears may be brought against him,
as neither we nor the BIA has jurisdiction to adjudicate whether
[the applicant] is guilty of them. . . . If [the applicant] is charged
upon his return, it will be for the Philippine courts to adjudicate
any charges.278
Similarly, in Adam v. Gonzales, the Fifth Circuit considered the actual guilt
of the asylum applicant irrelevant in determining whether his prosecution was
legitimate, even where circumstances strongly suggested that the newly-
installed government had filed criminal charges solely for political revenge
and where the INS produced no evidence indicating the alien’s guilt.279
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280. Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1578 (10th Cir. 1994).
281. See cases cited supra notes 252-80. 
282. Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1996).
283. See id. at 301; Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615 (6th Cir. 1994); Perlera-Escobar v.
Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1990). 
284. Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1997).  
285. Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2004).
286. Perkovic, 33 F.3d at 622.
Further, in Castaneda v. INS, the Tenth Circuit denied asylum to a Honduran
mistakenly identified by her government as a bank robber, admitting the
alien’s innocence, but choosing not to let that finding have any bearing on
determining the prosecution’s legitimacy.280
In deciding if a prosecution was legitimate, courts look to the level of due
process accorded an alien during investigation or trial, whether the
government ever filed criminal charges, whether the state has a legitimate
purpose behind the prosecution, if extra-judicial punishments might occur, and
whether the alien is guilty of the crime she is charged with.281  Even so, these
factors are not universally applied, and the level of scrutiny each of these
inquiries receives is often a function of the court considering an applicant’s
claim.
2. The Nature of the Underlying Law
Courts often evaluate prosecution in light of the legitimacy of the law the
state is enforcing.282  Thus, the second factor bearing on whether a government
has persecuted an alien is the nature of the law underlying the prosecution.283
In applying this factor, the Third Circuit chastised an immigration judge and
the Board of Immigration Appeals for failing to examine the nature of the
criminal statute China sought to enforce and the behavior the government
wanted to compel, “both of which help determine the motives of the alleged
persecutor.”284  Sharing this concern with the nature of the criminal law at
issue, Judge Posner observed that the most likely form of systematic
persecution is where a nation’s laws expressly authorize the persecution, as
exemplified by the persecution of the Jews under the Nuremberg Laws, for
merely because that mistreatment had the official sanction of enacted law
“doesn’t mean that Jews were not persecuted.”285
Following Posner’s observation, the Sixth Circuit has held that punishment
under laws prohibiting peaceful political expression would be political
persecution,286 and the Ninth Circuit found that India had persecuted an alien
under that nation’s antiterrorism laws that defined the crime of “terrorism”
broadly to facilitate the suppression of political dissent and secessionist
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287. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995).
288. Tuhin v. Ashcroft, No. 02-2661, 2003 WL 1342995, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003).
289. Bal v. Ashcroft, No. 03-73663, 2004 WL 2829288, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 9, 2004).
290. Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 962 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding that a death
sentence imposed by a Yemeni sharia court for alien’s conviction of manslaughter while in the
United States did not constitute persecution).
291. Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1992).
292. See Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1061 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that prosecution under
laws “that do not conform with accepted human rights standards — can constitute persecution”);
Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 301 n.3 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d
857, 863 (9th Cir. 1995)).
293. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987) (“If one thing is clear from the
legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that
one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . .”); Kevin R.
Johnson, Responding to the “Litigation Explosion”: The Plain Meaning of Executive Branch
Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REV. 413, 469 (1993); Adarkar, supra note 53, at 208;
Adell, supra note 36, at 797. 
294. S. REP. NO. 96-256, at 1 (1979), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141; see also
ideologies.287  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit criticized an immigration judge
for focusing solely on the facial legitimacy of charges against an alien under
Bangladesh’s Special Powers Act and Anti-Terrorism Act when it was clear
that the government frequently used those “sweeping laws” to punish political
expression.288  Nevertheless, the notion that a law should not be expansively
used to persecute does not require that a law is seen as illegitimate simply
because the law is informed by a protected ground, such as religion.  Thus, the
Ninth Circuit implied that prosecution for the crime of accidentally striking
and killing a sacred cow, if applied equally to all citizens, would not constitute
religious persecution.289  Analogously, the Second Circuit determined that
religious persecution does not result merely because a state “takes religion
into account in the provisions of its domestic criminal [code],” if that code
imposes similar punishments to those in many secular nations.290  Prosecution
under an Iranian law criminalizing apostasy, however, did constitute
persecution on account of religion.291
Significantly, prosecution may constitute persecution when the underlying
law the foreign government seeks to enforce violates internationally accepted
human rights principles.292  This human rights exception fulfills congressional
intent in passing the Refuge Act of 1980 to safeguard the human rights of
refugees by conforming American asylum law with the country’s obligations
under the UN Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.293  Indeed, the
Refugee Act’s legislative history reflects that Congress intended the Act to
give “statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns . . . .”294  In light of this clear congressional intent that
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Musalo, supra note 29, at 1182; Adell, supra note 36, at 797-98.
295. See Davis & Atchue, supra note 2, at 120; Joan Fitzpatrick, The International
Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELY J. INT’L L. 1, 15, 20 (1997); Isaacs, supra note
97, at 732; Mousin, supra note 4, at 591-92; Musalo, supra note 28, at 174; Adell, supra note
36, at 790-91.
296. See supra note 292 and accompanying text.
297. Ramos-Vasquez, 57 F.3d at 863.
298. Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 302 (9th Cir. 1996).
299. See Gou v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 1194, 1203 (9th Cir. 2004). 
300. See infra notes 302-17 and accompanying text.
301. See Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
U.S. law protects the human rights of refugees, international human rights
norms should inform asylum and withholding adjudications,295 and courts
should consider an alien’s prosecution to be persecution when the underlying
law the government seeks to enforce violates the alien’s basic, international
human rights.296
Courts have applied this human rights exception to grant asylum to a
Honduran who deserted the military to avoid participating in atrocities, where
he argued that the punishment he faced for desertion amounted to persecution
for his political opinion.297  Likewise, where a government does not respect
the “internationally recognized human right to peacefully protest,” prosecution
for political expression is not a legitimate exercise of state sovereignty.298
Nevertheless, as discussed further in Part V, while many courts apply the
human rights exception, others refuse to apply or consider that doctrine, even
where the law in question directly offends established human rights norms.
3. Context
Courts often examine the totality of circumstances in deciding if
persecution has occurred,299 and thus, the context in which an alien’s
prosecution takes place is crucial in deciding whether that prosecution is
legitimate or merely a pretext for the government’s invidious motives.  Courts
widely apply this contextual factor, which incorporates the broader political
atmosphere within the prosecuting nation as well as the prosecuted alien’s
individual experience.300  First, an assessment of the political conditions in a
particular country during the alien’s prosecution is necessary to determine
whether that prosecution has become political persecution.301  Li Wu Lin v.
INS illustrates such attention to the larger societal picture, as the Third Circuit
carefully considered context in rejecting the argument that a prominent
participant in the pro-democracy student protest movement leading up to the
Tiananmen Square massacre had been the target of legitimate prosecution for
trespassing on government property instead of for the expression of his
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302. Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2001). 
303. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Tuhin v. Ashcroft, No.
02-2661, 2003 WL 1342995, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003).  
304. Abramov v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71856, 2004 WL 2411254, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 22, 2004).
305. Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 2004); see also Jin Ying Li v. INS, 92
F.3d 985, 988 (9th Cir. 1996) (noting a report that of 118 illegal immigrants deported to Fiji
from the United States, there was no evidence of any pattern of government harassment or
imprisonment, and most were released within a few weeks of arrival after paying a fine).
306. Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 548 (2d Cir. 2005).
307. Shi Fei v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., No. 04-3407, 2005 WL 1140732, at *2 (3d Cir.
May 16, 2005).
308. Rugovac v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., No. 04-4382, 2005 WL 2891736, at *2 (3d Cir.
Nov. 3, 2005).
309. Bangura v. INS, No. 96-2805, 1997 WL 419253, at *2 (4th Cir. July 28, 1997).
political opinion.302  The Ninth Circuit has engaged in many similar inquiries
into the broader political landscape.  For instance, a court found persuasive
that the Indian government extensively used amorphous antiterrorism laws to
quell political dissenters and eradicate secessionist ideologies.303  Equally
outcome-determinative was the fact that near the time of a Ukrainian’s
prosecution for rape, the Soviet regime frequently fabricated rape charges
against persons actively opposing official corruption, as the alien had done.304
Further, in granting asylum and withholding to a Senegalese applicant, the
court took special notice of Senegal’s human rights abuses, including the
arrest and torture of hundreds of civilians by security forces and numerous
instances of extra-judicial executions and disappearances.305
Other circuits also recognize the injustice of considering an alien’s
prosecution in a political vacuum, as seen when the Second Circuit roundly
criticized an immigration judge for making no effort to examine the broader
context of government extortion and blackmail surrounding the prosecution
of a Chinese businessman who had voiced opposition to his local
government’s corruption.306  In another case, the Third Circuit rejected a
Chinese political persecution claim, in part because prosecutions for illegal
departure in China occur on a routine basis.307  Moreover, the Third Circuit
denied asylum to an alien from Serbia and Montenegro where the INS showed
that the government allowed similarly situated persons who had also refused
military service to perform alternative civilian service and that among the
handful of those tried for evading service, only three received prison
sentences.308  Additionally, the Fourth Circuit noted the widespread conditions
of violent upheaval in Sierra Leone in determining that the government had
not persecuted an alien or his relatives.309  Finally, the Eleventh Circuit
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1990).
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312. Kaur v. INS, No. 01-70805, 2002 WL 1136896, at *1 (9th Cir. May 30, 2002).
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also Singh v. INS, No. 00-70091, 2001 WL 259219, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2001) (finding
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political dissidents living nearby); Behzadpour v. United States, 946 F.2d 1351, 1353 (8th Cir.
1991) (attributing the failure to gain asylum and withholding in part to the finding that the
Iranian government would not single out a woman for her political views and her husband had
not endured mistreatment for affiliation with political dissidents or for his wife’s absence from
the country).
evaluated a Salvadoran’s claim of political persecution in light of “the context
of civil war where fear permeates the life of every citizen . . . .”310
In addition to the broader political context, courts also give considerable
weight to an alien’s personal history with her government, for “[t]he key
question is whether, looking at the cumulative effect of all the incidents a
petitioner has suffered,” her treatment rises to the level of persecution.311
First, courts consider events occurring before or during the contested state
behavior, as where a court determined an alien’s prosecution by the Indian
government illegitimate when the uncontested facts demonstrated a “pattern
of persecution” of the alien and her family members by security forces.312
Also, criminal charges against a Fijian folk singer did not comprise
persecution per se, but that alien’s treatment as a whole did amount to
persecution where government allies threatened his son with kidnapping,
armed men repeatedly stayed outside his front door, anonymous callers
threatened him with death, and government supporters killed his fellow
Marcos sympathizers.313  An alien’s relationship with her government before
or during the purported prosecution may also caution against finding that
persecution occurred, as evidenced when an appellate court determined that
an Albanian’s prosecution for illegally notarizing a confidential government
document was legitimate, primarily because the alien stayed at her
government job throughout the investigation, was given a passport during that
period, and had the freedom to travel internationally without detention or
arrest.314
Courts also frequently consider a foreign government’s treatment of an
alien following her prosecution in determining the prosecution’s legitimacy.
For instance, the fact that an Iranian asylum applicant, accused of illegally
possessing Western films, was able to attend law school and continue his
filmmaking career after his prosecution began suggested that the Iranian
government was merely prosecuting the alien, and not persecuting him for his
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317. Kapil v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71045, 2004 WL 1098784, at *2  (9th Cir. May 17, 2004)
(“[T]he fact that Kapil’s family still resides in the Punjab, and Kapil’s wife continues to work
for the Indian government, undercuts Kapil’s claim of future persection.”); Hakeem v. INS, 273
F.3d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 2001); Artola-Medal v. INS, No. 95-70006, 1996 WL 290057, at *1
(9th Cir. May 31, 1996). 
318. Sovich v. Esperdy, 319 F.2d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1963); see also Rodriguez-Roman v. INS,
98 F.3d 416, 429 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he IJ and the BIA erred as a matter of law in determining
that aliens who face punishment for the crime of illegal departure cannot establish persecution
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political beliefs.315  Similarly, an appellate court denied asylum and
withholding to a Vietnamese alien whom the government had detained and
beaten for committing fraud, where he had remained in Vietnam for three
years after the beating without suffering additional harm from the
government.316  Further, context may undermine an applicant’s persecution
claim when his family members continue to reside in the home country
without difficulties from the government.317  In sum, courts often evaluate the
political context surrounding an alien’s prosecution and the alien’s own
history with the government in determining whether prosecution is persecution
or legitimate law enforcement.
IV. Four Common Scenarios 
Part III constructed a general framework for distinguishing prosecution
from persecution by examining several rules, exceptions, and factors that have
guided courts in that endeavor.  This framework’s application is illustrated by
four scenarios that most frequently raise the persecution/prosecution
distinction: (1) illegal departure, (2) compulsory military service, (3) domestic
intelligence gathering, and (4) antigovernment activities.
A. Illegal Departure
Asylum and withholding applicants often argue that if deported, they will
face prosecution for illegally departing their home country, and that this
prosecution for merely leaving one’s country amounts to persecution.  In
1963, the Second Circuit laid the groundwork for adjudicating these
arguments by rejecting the notion that an alien’s imprisonment for illegal
departure may never constitute persecution within the meaning of U.S.
immigration laws.318  Generally, however, a state’s restrictions on traveling
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abroad do not amount to persecution,319 and similarly, any prosecution arising
from the violation of those restrictions is not in itself persecution.320  This is
true even where an alien’s punishment by her home government for illegal
departure would be harsher than the punishment imposed by the U.S.
government upon an  American citizen for violating the U.S. regulations
governing  international travel.321  Thus, neither a Nigerian’s detention for
using a false passport to leave his country nor a Haitian’s potential
punishment for departing her nation illegally without an exit visa amounted
to anything other than legitimate prosecution.322
Although Congress did not intend the United States as a refuge for common
criminals fleeing prosecution under generally applicable travel laws, it did
intend to grant asylum to those who would, “if returned, be punished
criminally for violating a politically motivated prohibition against defection
from a police state.”323  This has resulted in the “disproportionately severe
punishment” exception, which holds that an alien who leaves her country
because of one of the five enumerated grounds and who faces severe
punishment if deported home for the crime of illegal departure is presumed to
fear persecution within the meaning of asylum and withholding of removal.324
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petitioner may establish persecution within the meaning of the statute if he can show that he left
or remained away from his homeland for political reasons and that, if returned, he would be
subject to severe punishment, whether as the result of criminal prosecution or otherwise.”);
Abedini, 971 F.2d at 191.  Many of these cases rely heavily on the U.N.’s Handbook on
Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, which states: 
The legislation of certain States imposes severe penalties on [nationals] who
depart from the country in an unlawful manner or remain abroad without
authorization.  Where there is reason to believe that a person, due to his illegal
departure or unauthorized stay abroad is liable to such severe penalties his
recognition as a refugee will be justified if it can be shown that his motives for
leaving or remaining outside the country are related to the reasons [of race,
religion, political opinion, nationality, and membership in a particular social
group]. . . .
Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees [UNHCR], Handbook on Procedures and
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 61, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (Jan. 1, 1992)
[hereinafter Handbook], available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/publ/opendoc.pdf?
tbl=PUBL&id=3d58e13b4.
XXFor a concise description of the Handbook and the weight given it by U.S. courts, see INS
v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 438-39 (1987) (“In interpreting the Protocol’s definition of
‘refugee’ we are further guided by the analysis set forth in the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee
Status.”).  Additionally, while the Handbook does not have the force of law, it “provides
significant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress sought to conform [and] has
been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol establishes.”
Id. at 439 n.22; see also Bonavia, supra note 38, at 1051-52. 
325. Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 430.
326. Id.  For an instructive overview of the doctrine of imputed political opinion, see Yoo,
supra note 53. 
327. Kovac, 407 F.2d at 104; see also Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 430 (holding that
applicant must prove that “he is one of the persons at whom the illegal departure statute was
directed — persons who flee their homeland for political reasons”); In re Janus & Janek, 12 I.
& N. 866, 876 (B.I.A. 1968) (stating that an alien whose departure from her home country is
“devoid of political motivation” is not entitled to relief).  
This exception most often arises in the context of political persecution, where
an alien may establish persecution where she flees her country because of her
minority political opinion and who faces severe punishment for illegal
departure.325  The rationale for this rule is that a state that severely punishes
unlawful departure “views persons who illegally leave as disloyal and
subversive,” automatically imputing to them “a political opinion that the state
believes warrants an extreme form of punishment.”326  Aliens relying on this
exception must show, in addition to the prospect of severe punishment, that
their illegal departure was politically motivated.327  Thus, the Ninth Circuit
determined in Rodriguez-Roman v. INS that a Cuban was entitled to
withholding of removal and was eligible for asylum where he illegally fled
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328. Rodriguez-Roman, 98 F.3d at 431; see also Tesfamichael v. Gonzales, 411 F.3d 169,
177 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that imprisonment for violating Ethiopian travel laws against
smuggling amount to persecution on account of race, political belief, and membership in a
disfavored social group where the smuggled “item” was the violator’s Eritrean wife who would
“otherwise be forcibly separated by a war zone”); Li, 92 F.3d at 988.  But see Wang v. U.S.
Attorney Gen., No. 05-11125, 2005 WL 2373450, at *10 (11th Cir. Sept. 28, 2005); Shi Fei v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 04-3407, 2005 WL 1140732 (3d Cir. May 16, 2005); Liang v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, No. 02-4437, 2005 WL 147277, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 24, 2005) (finding that the
alien did not show that prosecution for her illegal exit from China would have any relation to
her political beliefs); Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 248 (3d Cir. 2001); Pilarte-Donaire v.
INS, No. 89-70508, 1991 WL 153454, at *4 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 1991) (holding that a Nicaraguan
feared prosecution, not persecution, for illegally leaving his country because he could not prove
that the potential criminal penalties would be severe).  For further exploration of the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Rodriguez-Roman, see Yoo, supra note 53, at 404; Bonavia, supra note 38;
Hall, supra note 27, at 128-29.
329. See supra text accompanying notes 324-25. 
330. In re A—G—, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502, 502 (B.I.A. 1987); see also Musalo, supra note 28,
at 207.
331. See Rugovac v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., No. 04-4382, 2005 WL 2891736, at *2 (3d
Cir. Nov. 3, 2005); Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2005); Vucic v.
Ashcroft, No. 01-4178, 2002 WL 31355239 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2002); Castaneda-Gonzales v.
INS, No. 99-71321, 2001 WL 238087, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 09, 2001) (“Compulsory military
service and prosecution for desertion do not constitute persecution under the INA.”); Vujisic
v. INS, 224 F.3d 578, 581 (7th Cir. 2000); Foroglou v. INS, 170 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 1999);
Sequeira-Arauz v. INS, No. 95-70754, 1997 WL 51756, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 1997); Krastev
v. INS, 101 F.3d 1213, 1217 (7th Cir. 1996); Abedini v. INS, 971 F.2d 188, 191 (9th Cir.
1992); Khalaf v. INS, 909 F.2d 589, 592 (1st Cir. 1990) (following Umanzor-Alvarado v. INS,
896 F.2d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 1990)) (ruling that Salvadoran likely imprisonment for failing to fulfill
military obligations constituted prosecution and not persecution); Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848
F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[R]equiring military service does not constitute persecution”);
In re A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 502 (holding that compulsory military service is a “sovereign right”
that does not amount to persecution); see also Musalo supra note 28, at 207. 
Cuba on account of his political beliefs and faced a “harsh, if not fatal”
punishment if deported.328  Nevertheless, unless an alien can show both a
protected motivation for flight and a potentially severe punishment, the
general rule prevails that prosecution for violating a nation’s travel laws
constitutes prosecution and not persecution.329
B. Compulsory Military Service
Just as a nation may regulate the foreign travel of its citizens, it has an
analogous “sovereign right” to require military service of its citizens.330  It is
well settled that prosecution for evading compulsory military service does not
constitute persecution on a protected ground and may therefore not provide a
basis for asylum or withholding.331  For the same reason, a government does
not persecute when it prosecutes a citizen for illegally assisting others in
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/4
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332. See Tooth v. INS, No. 96-70067, 1997 WL 265099, at *1 (9th Cir. May 19, 1997)
(concluding that prosecution for hiding a draft dodger is prosecution and not persecution);
Sequeira-Arauz, 1997 WL 51756, at *3 (holding that the Sandinista government’s incarceration
and investigation of an alien for smuggling draftees out of Nicaragua was not persecution);
Rodriguez-Rivera, 848 F.2d at 1005.
333. Padilla-Rocha v. INS, No. 95-70432, 1996 WL 547992, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1996)
(finding that an alien’s punishment for failing to follow an order to draft underage boys into
military service was not persecution).
334. Vucic, 2002 WL 31355239, at *2; see also Nguyen v. Reno, 211 F.3d 692, 696 (1st Cir.
2000); Vujisic, 224 F.3d at 581 (finding that an alien showed well-founded fear of persecution
on account of political beliefs where “Serbian officials singled out Vujisic for persecution above
that of other draftees, deserters and Slovenian sympathizers because of his Slovenian
background”); In re A-G-, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 506. 
335. Duarte de Guinac v. INS, 179 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Vujisic, 224 F.3d at
581 (holding that a Slovenian alien established persecution where the government targeted his
ethnicity and physically abused him because of his cultural background).
336. For an early argument in favor of the conscientious objection exception, see Karen
Musalo, Swords into Ploughshares: Why the United States Should Provide Refuge to Young
Men Who Refuse to Bear Arms for Reasons of Conscience, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849, 877-78
(1989) (noting that the “right to conscienctious objection has long been recognized in the
United States, and there is an emerging trend toward its recognition as a fundamental human
right,” and arguing that decisions to grant asylum to conscientious objectors “should be
informed by domestic and international norms”).
337. See Vujisic, 224 F.3d at 581 (stating that “in some cases, refusal to enter the army may
render one a refugee if for instance, the reason for refusal is a ‘genuine political, religious or
moral conviction or to valid reasons of conscience’”).
338. See Vucic, 2002 WL 31355239, at *2 (recognizing that forced military service can
amount to persecution where “the applicant would be required to commit human rights
abuses”); Rodriguez v. INS, No. 96-70504, 1997 WL 572164, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 12, 1997)
(refusing to consider the argument - raised for the first time on appeal - that an alien’s
prosecution for desertion would be persecution where desertion was based on the alien’s refusal
to violate the Geneva Conventions); see also Musalo, supra note 28, at 207-11 (discussing the
avoiding compulsory military service,332 or when prosecuting a citizen for
breaching military discipline.333
These broad rules are not without exception.  For instance, prosecution for
avoiding military service may rise to the level of persecution where
“disproportionately severe punishment would result on account of one of the
five . . . grounds,”334 or where the deserter has endured constant beatings and
verbal abuse from his superiors on account of his minority ethnicity.335  The
most notable exception exists when an alien refuses to serve for reasons of
conscience.336  Although some opinions may suggest that mere conscientious
objection, by itself, transforms a prosecution for refusal to serve into
persecution,337 courts generally require that the alien’s conscientious objection
result from a refusal to commit abuses of internationally recognized human
rights,338 or “engage in inhuman conduct.”339  Many of these decisions rely
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conscientious objection exception generally and noting that asylum claims based on religiously
motivated conscientious objection have faired poorly in American courts, and citing as a
landmark case Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992), where the Ninth Circuit
held that a state’s punishment of a Jehovah’s Witness for refusing to perform military service
is not religious persecution). 
339. Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1995).  For additional discussion
on the conscientious objection exception, see Guidelines, supra note 102 (noting that in cases
of conscientious objection, a generally applicable law may, “depending on the circumstances,
nonetheless be persecutory where, for instance, it impacts differently on particular groups,
where it is applied or enforced in a discriminatory manner, where the punishment itself is
excessive or disproportionately severe, or where the military service cannot reasonably be
expected to be performed by the individual because of his or her genuine beliefs or religious
convictions”).
340. Handbook, supra note 324, ¶ 171; see also Mark Muschenheim, M.A. v. INS: No
Asylum for Those Refusing to Associate with a Military Engaged in Human Rights Abuses, 16
ILSA J. INT’L L. 39 (1993) (noting that American jurisprudence mirrors the Handbook in
holding that avoiding compulsory military service does not generally result in prosecution, and
discussing that document’s exception to this rule). 
341. Handbook, supra note 324, ¶ 171; see also Tagaga v. INS, 228 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th
Cir. 1995) (stating that “[i]t is well established, however, that a government may not
legitimately punish an official for refusing to carry out an inhumane order,” and holding that a
Fijian who faced court-martial for refusing to persecute ethnic minorities faced persecution and
not prosecution).
342. See Tooth v. INS, No. 96-70067, 1997 WL 265099, at *1 (9th Cir. May 19, 1997)
(holding that prosecution for hiding a draft dodger is prosecution and not persecution);
Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that the Sandinista
government’s incarceration and investigation of alien for smuggling draftees out of Nicaragua
was not persecution).
heavily on the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Handbook
on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, which states that
if the military actions in which the alien refuses to participate are “condemned
by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct,
punishment for desertion or draft-evasion could . . . in itself be regarded as
persecution.”340  Applying this provision, prosecution for an alien’s desertion
of the Serbian military was political persecution where it arose from his
opposition to his government’s political and nationalistic policies, which
included a genocidal strategy in the Balkan republics.341
This human rights exception reveals an interesting tension in the law
surrounding compulsory military service.  As noted above, a government does
not normally persecute a citizen when it prosecutes him for assisting others in
avoiding compulsory military service,342 but the human rights exception
suggests that a state persecutes an alien when it prosecutes him for helping a
fellow citizen avoid military service, where that service would violate
internationally recognized human rights norms.  Courts often fail to reach this
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/4
2007] COMMENTS 161
343. Padilla-Rocha v. INS, No. 95-70432, 1996 WL 547992, at *1 (9th Cir. 1996).  This
decision is somewhat reminiscent of Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 1994) (reviewing
a case where the government sought an Iranian high school principal when he counseled a
fourteen-year-old boy to not participate in the Iraqi war).  
344. See infra note 386 and accompanying text. 
345. Ramos-Vasquez v. INS, 57 F.3d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 1995).  
346. Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995); Perlera-Escobar v. Executive
Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1990). 
347. See Senathirajah v. INS, 157 F.3d 210, 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that even when used
to interrogate potential terrorists, “torture does not constitute valid governmental
investigation”); Balazoski v. INS, 932 F.2d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1991); Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 832
F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (“[W]hile the government has the legitimate right to
combat terrorism through the arrest and interrogation of suspected terrorists, this right does not
include the beating and torture of detainees.”).
348. Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1998). 
349. Ndom v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 743, 755 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ratnam, 154 F.3d at
result, however, as seen in Padilla-Rocha v. INS, where the Ninth Circuit held
that an alien’s punishment for failing to draft underage boys into military
service was not persecution but prosecution,343 even though the use of child
soldiers is a clear violation of global human rights norms.344  In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit held the previous year that a Honduran soldier faced political
persecution for his desertion, which he undertook to avoid carrying out the
improper summary execution of his friend, because that order would have
forced the applicant to engage in inhuman conduct.345
C. Domestic Intelligence Gathering
A third scenario commonly requiring a court to distinguish between
persecution and prosecution is where a government brutally interrogates an
alien in an effort to gather intelligence concerning domestic terrorist or
secessionist groups.  These cases present a fine line between a state’s
legitimate or sovereign right to investigate suspected enemies of the
government and “governmental persecution” based on an alien’s political
beliefs.346  First, U.S. law considers torture an illegitimate tool of
investigation,347 and some courts apply a presumption of persecution on
account of political opinion when the government tortures an alien and does
not initiate a legitimate criminal prosecution.348  Most cases, however, focus
on the mixed-motive analysis and hold that an alien’s severe mistreatment in
the absence of any legitimate criminal prosecution, conducted at least partly
on account of his political opinion, provides a proper basis for asylum and
withholding of deportation, even where the government’s motivation for
detaining and mistreating a suspected terrorist partially stems from genuine
intelligence purposes and security concerns.349
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996) (finding that torture “in the absence of any legitimate criminal prosecution, conducted at
least in part on account of political opinion, provides a proper basis for asylum and withholding
of deportation, even if the [torture] served intelligence gathering purposes”); see also Singh v.
Gonzales, 406 F.3d 191, 198 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Singh may therefore establish eligibility for
asylum even if, as the Government contends and the BIA found, there was some ‘legitimate
security purpose’ . . . behind his arrest and mistreatment, if he establishes that the mistreatment
was also motivated by the police’s attribution of his father’s political opinion to him.”); Singh
v. Ilchert, No. 98-16549, 1999 WL 519002, at *3 (9th Cir. July 20, 1999) (holding that the
police’s detention and torture of an Indian whom they considered a Sikh separatist was
presumed political persecution where the police never filed any charges); Kaurr v. INS, No. 97-
70678, 1998 WL 416112, at *3 (9th Cir. June 17, 1998) (“We are aware that one of the police’s
objectives in arresting and abusing Singh may have been to obtain information that would lead
to the apprehension of terrorists.  Nevertheless, . . . Singh was persecuted at least in part because
of his political opinion.”); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[E]xtra-
judicial punishment of suspected anti-government guerrillas can constitute persecution on
account of imputed political opinion.”); Blanco-Lopez v. INS, 858 F.2d 531, 534 (9th Cir.
1988) (stating that state security forces’ detention of a Salvadoran was not a legitimate criminal
prosecution where those forces threatened the alien with death if he did not admit to being a
guerilla).
350. Singh, 63 F.3d at 1508; see also Ratnam, 154 F.3d at 995.
351. 69 F.3d 375 (9th Cir. 1995).




In determining whether an alien’s treatment occurred in part because of her
actual or imputed political opinion, many courts scrutinize the legal
framework governing the investigation or interrogation.  For instance, a court
found that an Indian was the victim of government persecution where the
record revealed: “India defines ‘terrorism’ so broadly, and treats those accused
or suspected of terrorism so harshly, that police ‘investigations’ of many
suspected terrorists are not legitimate government functions but rather part of
a pattern of political suppression.”350
Most cases confronting government brutality in the context of antiterrorist
intelligence gathering follow the general pattern of Singh v. Ilchert.351
Surinder Pal Singh was a native of the Punjab region of India and a devout
Sikh.352  Many of the Sikh community in Punjab had been fighting for an
independent Sikh state separate from India, and in 1988, several of these
violent separatists forced themselves into Singh’s home, demanding that his
family provide them with food and shelter.353  Singh had no choice but to
comply.354  When the Indian police learned of this, they surmised that Singh
was a separatist supporter and promptly arrested him.355  Despite Singh’s
repeated denials of this accusation, the police interrogated him and beat him







360. Id. at 379.
361. Id. 
362. Id. 
363. Id. at 379 n.1.
364. Id. 
365. Id. at 380-81.
366. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2005); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d
990, 993 (9th Cir. 1998); Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 832 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1993)
(finding that where no “actual, legitimate criminal prosecution was ever initiated against either
petitioner . . . . it appears undeniable that the petitioners were arrested and abused because the
revived him with water so the beatings could resume.356  This initial detention
lasted two days, and in the months that followed, the Sikh separatists
periodically continued to force themselves into Singh’s home.357  The police
arrested Singh again, and on each day of this six-day imprisonment, beat him
and tightened a leather belt around his torso until he lost consciousness.358
After this second episode, Singh feared that his arrests and torture would
continue, so he fled his home to stay with relatives in another region of India
and later left the country, eventually arriving in the United States.359
The Ninth Circuit ruled that Singh suffered persecution on account of
imputed political opinion, because the police had tortured him for what they
believed to be his sympathy with or support of the Sikh separatists.360  The
court held, “because the police imputed to Singh the beliefs of the Sikh
separatists and harmed him on that basis, the punishment was inflicted with
a political motive.”361  Also suggesting persecution, and not merely
prosecution, was the fact that Singh’s suffering did not occur in the context of
a “legitimate government investigation or criminal prosecution.”362  The court
rejected the contention that the Indian government had not persecuted Singh,
because the police’s real motive had been to gather intelligence regarding the
Sikh rebels.363  Although security and intelligence concerns may have partially
motivated the police in detaining and torturing Singh, the court found that his
mistreatment occurred in part because the police believed he shared the
separatists’ political beliefs.364  Therefore, the court held Mr. Singh eligible
for asylum and withholding of deportation.365  Singh’s story parallels that of
several other aliens who received refuge when courts applied the mixed-
motive analysis to conclude that while the government had abused them in
part for intelligence gathering purposes, the state also had acted in part
because of its perception that the aliens harbored disfavored political
beliefs.366 
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authorities believed that they were members or supporters” of a dissident political group
supporting separatism through terrorist methods); Singh v. Ilchert, 801 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Cal.
1992); cf. Singh v. INS, No. 00-70091, 2001 WL 259219, at *1-2 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2001)
(holding that the Indian police’s arrest of a member of the All India Sikh Students Federation
was precipitated by a legitimate investigation into illegal terrorist activity and not on account
of the member’s political opinion); Attal v. INS, No. 95-9514, 1996 WL 91929, at *3 (10th Cir.
Mar. 4, 1996) (determining that the Jordanian government did not persecute a Palestinian citizen
on account of his race or political opinions where Jordanian intelligence officials severely
mistreated him in an effort to gain his cooperation in obtaining information about the Palestinian
Liberation Organization’s Syrian activities); Ozdemir v. INS, 46 F.3d 6, 7-8 (5th Cir. 1994)
(considering the government’s arrest of an ethnically Kurdish citizen of Turkey after his
participation in a Kurdish antigovernment demonstration and its detention of him for three days
where authorities beat him on the soles of his feet while interrogating him about his
participation in several terrorist organizations, and finding that the Turkish government had not
persecuted Ozdemir, because the police were merely searching for information on terrorist
incidents and organizations). 
367. For an introduction to the general right of foreign government’s to protect themselves
from domestic enemies, see Carolyn Patty Blum, License to Kill: Asylum Law and the Principle
of Legitimate Governmental Authority to “Investigate Its Enemies,” 28 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
719, 721 (1992) (arguing that the BIA permits investigations, “often in an arbitrary and brutal
fashion, by governments against persons engaged in antigovernment activity,” and noting the
heightened danger facing such aliens in this particularly incoherent facet of immigration law).
368. See Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Universal Declaration of




Singh v. Ilchert illustrates the tension between an alien’s right to be free
from political persecution and his government’s right to protect itself from
domestic enemies - a tension that resurfaces in cases regarding an alien’s
prosecution for engaging in anti-government demonstrations or attempted
coups.367  Although international law allows sovereign nations to protect
themselves from revolutionaries and common criminals, it does not allow
states to prohibit and punish peaceful political expression and activity.368
Thus, where a state outlaws the peaceful expression of dissenting political
opinion, an alien punished under that policy has been persecuted on account
of his political belief.369  Under this rule, Albania’s arrest, detention and
beating of an Albanian for participating in nonviolent demonstrations that
publicly opposed the government’s civil rights record constituted persecution
for his political opinion.370  Similarly, in Li Wu Lin v. INS, the government did
not legitimately prosecute a Chinese middle school student for marching in the
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol60/iss1/4
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371. Li Wu Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2001); see also Hoque v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d
1190 (9th Cir. 2004); Tuhin v. Ashcroft, 2003 WL 1342995, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003)
(holding that even where a citizen of Bangladesh participated in a protest that erupted into a
violent clash with the police, the police’s arrest and brutal treatment of the citizen was not
legitimate prosecution, but persecution on account of political opinion where he was “repeatedly
beaten by Bangladesh police for his activism on behalf of the Jatiya Party”).
372. Ahmed v. INS, No. 97-71313, 1999 WL 1048665, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 18. 1999).
373. Kapil v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71045, 2004 WL 1098784, at *1 (9th Cir. May 17, 2004);
see also Mullai v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 635, 638-39 (6th Cir. 2004); Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382
F.3d 318, 323-24 (3d Cir. 2004) (upholding immigration judge’s ruling that government had
not persecuted alien for his political opinions, but rather, he was “legitimately prosecuted for
his participation in a violent political demonstration”); Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975 (8th
Cir. 2004) (determining that a Kenyan’s prosecution for participation in a Nairobi pro-
democracy demonstration-turned-riot was not persecution for political opinion). 
374. Nkacoahng v. INS, 83 F.3d 353, 355 (11th Cir. 1996); see also Artola-Medal v. INS,
No. 95-70006, 1996 WL 290057, at *1 (9th Cir. May 31, 1996) (ruling that the Nicaraguan
applicant’s prosecution was “consistent with an offense of defacement of government property
and did not constitute a basis for finding that [he] was being sought out because of his alleged
‘expression of political opinion’”).
375. Gheith v. INS, No. 9470162, 1995 WL 555779, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 18, 1995).
376. See Chanco v. INS, 82 F.3d 298, 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
pro-democracy demonstrations leading up to the Tiananmen Square
Massacre.371
This protection of nonviolent political expression, however, does not shield
aliens who have committed ordinary criminal actions.  Thus, the government
of Bangladesh merely prosecuted and did not persecute one of its citizens for
his political beliefs when the government arrested him for participating in a
violent demonstration where protestors carried hockey sticks and pipe
bombs.372  Likewise, Indian authorities legitimately arrested an alien for
threatening violence to the police when his fellow demonstrators carried signs
calling for “death to police officers.”373  Further, courts have denied asylum
and withholding to a South African arrested for the arson of his school and his
principal’s car that occurred during anti-apartheid political strikes,374 and have
held that Israeli authorities did not persecute a Palestinian native of the Israeli-
occupied West Bank for his political beliefs when officials detained and
interrogated him on two occasions regarding incidents of rock-throwing.375
Although prosecution for an alien’s peaceful efforts to change her
government clearly amounts to political persecution, the result when a state
prosecutes an asylum or withholding applicant for trying to change her
government through violent means is less apparent.  Clearly, prosecution for
common crimes is distinct from persecution, but participating in an attempted
coup raises an added political dimension, for a coup is an inherently political
act.376  The general rule is that prosecution for attempting to overthrow a
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377. See Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that
prosecution for fomenting rebellion or civil war is not persecution within the meaning of asylum
law); Perkovic v. INS, 33 F.3d 615, 622 (6th Cir. 1994); Perlera-Escobar v. Executive Office
for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1990); Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970,
979 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Griffin, supra note 98, at 1134-35 (noting the United States’ authority
to punish nonviolent treason, and arguing that the “exercise of the same authority by legitimate
foreign governments should not be impugned lightly, if indirectly, through our asylum
structure”).
378. Dwomoh, 696 F. Supp. at 979. 
379. Id. at 979, followed in Chanco, 82 F.3d at 302.  For a discussion of the Dwomoh case,
see Griffin, supra note 98, at 1135-36, and Michelle N. Lewis, Note, The Political-Offense
Exception: Reconciling the Tension Between Human Rights and International Public Order,
63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 585, 601-02 (1995). 
lawfully constituted government does not equal persecution because
governments have an internationally recognized right to defend themselves
against rebellious attacks.377  This rule, however, is inapplicable in countries
where a coup is the only avenue for changing the government and where the
government punishes those who express opposition.378  Dwomoh v. Sava
articulated the widely-adopted rule that protects coup participants under
certain circumstances by ruling that a Ghana native’s punishment for
participating in a coup amounted to political persecution:
[I]n countries where there is no procedure by which citizens can
freely and peacefully change their laws, officials or form of
government, and where some individuals who express views
critical of the government are arrested and held incommunicado for
long periods without due process, a coup attempt is a form of
expression of political opinion the prosecution of which can
qualify as “persecution” within the statutory definition of
“refugee.”  When a participant in an attempted coup has been
beaten or tortured during detention, there is no doubt that he is
being persecuted on account of his political opinion.379
British authorities would therefore legitimately prosecute a band of
disenchanted Londoners for attempting to violently overthrow Parliament
while the Iraqi government, during the 1990s, would have persecuted political
dissidents for the same behavior in Baghdad.  This rationale led the Ninth
Circuit to rule that a Filipino’s prosecution for participating in a coup d’etat
was not persecution on account of his political opinion, because the record
indicated that the government of the Philippines tolerated diverse political
views and that the alien could have lawfully expressed his views “without
resort to a violent attempt to overthrow the democratically elected
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380. Chanco, 82 F.3d at 302; see also Mbaye v. Ashcroft, No. 02-72832, 2003 WL
22977465, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 2003) (finding that the Malian government prosecuted and
did not persecute a Malian for an imputed political opinion when his father attempted a coup
because a “a coup was not the only means of effectuating political change in Mali”); Baguma
v. Ashcroft, No. 02-61136, 2003 WL 22770170, at *1 (5th Cir. Nov. 24, 2003) (holding that
the punishment of a Ugandan for passing military secrets to rebels was not persecution for his
political opinion); Tadeo v. INS, No. 94-70643, 1996 WL 207141, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 26,
1996) (concluding that the Philippine government had not persecuted a Filipino for his political
beliefs in prosecuting him for attempting to overthrow the Aquino government, where he had
the option of “engaging in peaceful dissent and political debate”).
381. Dwomoh, 696 F. Supp. at 979.
382. See Chanco, 82 F.3d at 302 (holding that prosecution for attempting to violently
overthrow a duly constituted government does not amount to persecution); Griffin, supra note
105, at 1134. 
383. See supra note 292 and accompanying text. 
government.”380  To determine whether prosecution for a coup attempt
amounts to persecution, it is essential to obtain an accurate understanding of
the political conditions within a given country when that attempt occurred.381
In sum, where peaceful and lawful means of protesting the government are
available, prosecution for assisting in a coup d’etat is no different than
prosecution for an ordinary, nonpolitical crime.382
V. Roadblocks to Refuge: Inconsistent Rules and Unaccountable
Immigration Courts
Although the general framework for distinguishing prosecution from
persecution is clear, the jurisprudence concerning this distinction reveals two
significant barriers to legitimate claims for refuge.  First, asylum and
withholding applicants confront the inconsistent application of the human
rights exception and the mixed-motive analysis, both of which are crucial in
reaching just outcomes.  Secondly, aliens fleeing state-imposed persecution
must confront the tendency of many immigration courts to inaccurately apply
relevant legal principles and the inability of appellate courts to meaningfully
review those flawed decisions.  As a consequence, even where a government
has truly persecuted an alien, the uneven interpretation and application of
asylum law may deny that alien protection.
A. Inconsistent Rules
1. The Human Rights Exception
As noted above, many circuits adhere to the rule that an asylum applicant’s
prosecution constitutes persecution when the criminal law the state is
enforcing violates internationally accepted human rights principles.383  Many
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384. Saleh v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 962 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1992).  For additional discussion
of that holding, see Douglass Hollowell, 1991-92 Survey of International Law in the Second
Circuit, 19 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 93, 140-42 (1993). 
385. For an illustration of the human rights concerns the Saleh court chose to ignore, see
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights, Status of the International
Covenants on Human Rights: Question of the Death Penalty, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2003/106
(Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/106/54/
pdf/G0310654.pdf?OpenElement.  The document states:
Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty
. . . establish that: (a) capital punishment may be imposed only for the most
serious crimes; . . . (d) capital punishment may be imposed only when the guilt is
based upon clear and convincing evidence leaving no room for an alternative
explanation of facts; and (e) the death sentence may only be carried out pursuant
to a final judgement rendered by a competent court after legal process which gives
all possible safeguards to ensure a fair trial, including the right of a defendant to
adequate legal assistance; (f) the right to appeal against the death sentence to a
court of higher jurisdiction must be granted; (g) the right to seek pardon or
commutation of sentence must be granted; (h) capital punishment shall not be
carried out pending any appeal or other recourse procedure; and (i) when capital
punishment occurs, it shall be carried out so as to inflict minimum suffering.
Id.
386. Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1146 (10th Cir. 1994) (Kane, J., dissenting) (citing
Colleen C. Maher, Note, The Protection of Children in Armed Conflict: A Human Rights
Analysis of the Protection Afforded to Children in Warfare, 9 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 297, 300
(1989)); see also Isaacs, supra note 97, at 733 (noting that Article 38 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits the recruiting of children below the age of
fifteen into a state’s military and that this prohibition has “attained the status of customary
decisions, however, fail to inquire whether the underlying law comports with
global human rights norms, even when the facts warrant such an investigation.
For example, in Saleh v. U.S. Department of Justice, the Second Circuit
denied an alien asylum and deported him to Yemen to face a sharia imposed
death sentence for committing the crime of manslaughter while in the United
States.384  The Saleh court chose not to inquire whether the alien’s Yemeni
death sentence violated global human rights norms, notwithstanding that
international human rights principles preclude capital punishment for mere
manslaughter.  International human rights norms also dictate that a capital
sentence should be carried out only when meaningful due process has been
afforded a defendant, as opposed to Saleh’s in absentia conviction and
sentence, which were issued by religious leaders thousands of miles from the
crime scene.385  Likewise, in Sadeghi v. INS, the Tenth Circuit deemed
legitimate the prosecution of an Iranian high school principal where his crime
was counseling a fourteen-year-old boy not to go to war, in spite of the
“universally held ideal that children should not be involved in armed
combat.”386  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that punishment for a soldier’s
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international law”).  
387. Padilla-Rocha v. INS, No. 95-70432, 1996 WL 547992, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 25, 1996).
388. Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 1996).  For additional discussion of the Fisher
case, see Bret Thiele, Persecution on Account of Gender: A Need for Refugee Law Reform, 11
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 221, 225-26 (2000); Audrey Macklin, Comment, Cross-Border
Shopping for Ideas: A Critical Review of United States, Canadian, and Australian Approaches
to Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 25, 43-44 (1998); Diana Saso,
Comment, The Development of Gender-Based Asylum Law: A Critique of the 1995 INS
Guidelines, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 263, 303-06 (1997).
389. See Najmabadi v. Ashcroft, , No. 03-71311, 2004 WL 1869307 (9th Cir. Aug. 18,
2004); Abbassi v. INS, No. 98-70375, 1999 WL 730365, *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999); Fisher,
79 F.3d at 961 (stating that, “although enforcement of Iran’s dress and conduct rules may seem
harsh by Western standards, it does not ‘rise to the level of persecution’”).
390. Mahsa Aliaskari, Comment, U.S. Asylum Law Applied to Battered Women Fleeing
Islamic Countries, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 231, 271 (2000) (noting that the “legal
and cultural conditions in Iran create the perfect environment for sex-based persecution and
oppression”).  See generally Michael F. Polk, Note, Women Persecuted Under Islamic Law: The
Zina Ordinance in Pakistan as a Basis for Asylum Claims in the United States, 12 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 379 (1998) (making a case for gender-based persecution in Pakistan that is facilitated by
laws against extramarital sex).
391. Abbassi, 1999 WL 730365, at *1.
failure to draft underage boys constituted legitimate criminal prosecution.387
In each of these cases, the court held that a foreign government had not
persecuted the alien, notwithstanding the fact that the underlying law the state
sought to enforce ran directly counter to global human rights norms.
Another instance of the human rights exception’s inconsistent application
occurs in the treatment of women.  For example, in Fisher v. INS, the Ninth
Circuit held that the Iranian government’s criminal prosecution of a woman
for mistakenly exposing a few strands of hair from behind her veil was
legitimate prosecution and therefore not grounds for asylum.388  Although
courts addressing such a scenario often note that fundamentalist regimes’
gender-specific dress and conduct rules conflict with American views on
gender equality, those courts nevertheless follow Fisher in denying claims for
asylum arising from the imposition of these standards.389  Many gender-based
asylum claims arise from laws in Islamic countries that specifically target
women because of their gender,390 and one decision encountering such a claim
illustrates the typical rationale for denying the applicant refuge:
Abbassi testified that she, like other Iranian women, was arrested
several times for not wearing a veil.  Because Abbassi presented no
evidence that she was disproportionately punished or pretextually
prosecuted on account of her religious or political beliefs, or any
other prohibited ground, her arrest for dress code violations do not
amount to persecution.391
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392. See Musalo, supra note 28, at 213 (discussing legal, social and religious values
restricting and dictating the status of women in many societies, and noting that a “broad range
of penalties may be imposed for failure to comply with these norms, from flogging to stoning
to death”); Aliaskari, supra note 390, at 271; Teresa Peters, Note, International Refugee Law
the Treatment of Gender-Based Persecution: International Initiatives as a Model and Mandate
for National Reform, 6 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 240 (1996) (discussing several
instances of egregious gender-based prosecution and concluding, “It is clear that the Islamic
treatment of women under the tenets of the Koran is contrary to international human rights
norms”). 
393. See cases cited supra notes 388-89.
394. See Thiele, supra note 388, at 229 (noting also that “[t]o date, there has been no case
in which sex or gender on its own has been sufficient to establish membership in a particular
social group,” and arguing that reliance on the social group factor has been ineffective);
Aliaskari, supra note 390, at 281 (arguing that the BIA’s constricted “interpretation of a
particular social group does not allow women who encounter violence to make successful
claims”); Jenny-Brooke Condon, Comment, Asylum Law’s Gender Paradox, 33 SETON HALL
L. REV. 207, 250 (2002) (noting that in gender-based claims of persecution, the narrow
definition of “‘social group’ . . . persists as a barrier to women”); Saso, supra note 388, at 307
(discussing the BIA and the federal courts’ “reluctance to construct broad social groups which
could accommodate ‘too many’ asylum applicants”); see also Polk, supra note 390, at 379
(observing that women refugees fleeing violence generally seek asylum under persecution
claims based on membership in a persecuted social group, and arguing that women persecuted
under Islamic law should also argue that they have been persecuted on account of religion).
One successful argument brought by women asylum-seekers proceeding under the social group
theory is that certain victims or potential victims of female genital mutilation deserve protection
based on their membership in a persecuted social group.  See Eva N. Juncker, Comment, A
Juxtaposition of U.S. Asylum Grants to Women Fleeing Female Genital Mutilation and to Gays
and Lesbians Fleeing Physical Harm: The Need to Promulgate an INS Regulation for Women
Fleeing Female Genital Mutilation, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 253, 258 (1998) (discussing five
asylum grants based on female genital mutilation (FGM) and noting that each was based on the
victim’s membership in a particular social group).  One such case was In re Kasinga, 21 I. &
N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996), where the court found that the alien, who feared being forced
to submit to a FGM, was a member of a protected social group consisting of “young women of
the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who
oppose the practice.”  Id. at 365.  Significantly, the court hinted at the human rights exception
in noting that female genital mutilation amounted to persecution in part because the
international community had condemned the practice.  Id.; see also Fitzpatrick, supra note 295,
at 17.  Beyond FGM, however, gender-based persecution claims have not been successful.
Even though the treatment of women in many societies clearly offends global
human rights norms,392 American courts have denied these and other gender-
based persecution claims without inquiring as to whether the law in question
is contrary to accepted principles of international human rights.393  Precluded
from arguing that their treatment violates human rights norms, female asylum
applicants must instead contend that their persecution stems from membership
in a disfavored social group.  This argument has largely failed,394 however,
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395. See Sharif v. INS, 87 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1996) (denying an asylum claim where
the female applicant feared persecution under Iranian laws that limited the rights and freedoms
of women and subjected them to draconian punishment for violation because “punishment
which results from violating a country’s laws of general applicability, absent some showing that
the punishment is being administered for a nefarious purpose,” does not constitute persecution);
Safaie v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994), superseded by statute, Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546
(1996), as recognized in Rife v. Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606 (8th Cir. 2004); Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d
1233, 1243 n.12 (3d Cir. 1993) (denying an Iranian woman asylum because she “had not shown
that she and the other members of her group would be persecuted but only that they would be
subjected to the same restrictions and regulations applicable to the Iranian population in
general” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Thiele, supra note 388, at 237 (arguing that claims
of persecution based on membership in a particular social group have been ineffective,
especially “where women come from countries and societies in which they are persecuted
generally,” because female applicants are required to distinguish their persecution as being
greater than the average women in the particular country); Aliaskari, supra note 390, at 254
n.145. 
396. Condon, supra note 394, at 252. 
397. See Najmabadi v. Ashcroft, No. 03-71311, 2004 WL 1869307 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2004);
Abbassi v. INS, No. 98-70375, 1999 WL 730365 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 1999); Fisher v. INS, 79
F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996).
398. See Thiele, supra note 388, at 221 (maintaining that U.S. immigration law has “failed
to establish an adequate framework within which to address the unique problems of refugee
women”); Aliaskari, supra note 390, at 281; Macklin, supra note 388, at 27-28 (arguing that
the architects of asylum law “have erected various obstacles to recognizing the validity of
gender-related refugee claims,” and criticizing immigration courts whose decisions require “a
special effort of will not to apply existing principles to the situation of women”); Saso, supra
note 388, at 265 (noting that asylum advocates have constantly tried to expose “the plight of
refugee women by highlighting the inconsistencies in the case law and the uncertainty inherent
in presenting asylum claims based on gender-related persecution”); Anita Sinha, Note, Domestic
Violence and U.S. Asylum Law: Eliminating the “Cultural Hook” for Claims Involving Gender-
Related Persecution, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1562, 1564 (2001) (finding that asylum applications
based on gender-related persecution “continue[] to face difficulty before immigration tribunals,”
and arguing that female persecution victims “have been unable to overcome the cultural
stereotypes and gender inequities that pervade asylum law”).
because the gender-specific laws at issue are “generally applicable” to all
women within a given country.395  Denying asylum to women facing society-
wide persecution for this reason is paradoxical in that “[c]oncern over the size
of the group sharing the protected characteristic has generally not been a
barrier for persons persecuted on account of their race or religion.”396
Thus, the absence of a human rights inquiry coupled with the unavailability
of the disfavored social group argument when gender-based persecution
occurs on a mass scale means that courts often deny persecuted women
asylum and withholding.397  As a result, many criticize U.S. immigration law
for failing to provide adequate protection for female refugees.398  This
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399. See Thiele, supra note 388, at 237 (noting that “the omission of a gender category has
resulted in a lack of protection for many women fleeing persecution”); Condon, supra note 394,
at 248-56 (“Congress should act to honor the United States’ international obligation to protect
all refugees by amending the asylum statute.”); Marian Kennady, Note, Gender-Related
Persecution and the Adjudication of Asylum Claims: Is a Sixth Category Needed?, 12 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 317 (1998); Todd Stewart Schenk, Note, A Proposal to Improve the Treatment of
Women in Asylum Law: Adding a “Gender” Category to the International Definition of
“Refugee,” 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 301 (1994).
400. See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, div. C, sec. 601(a)(1), § 101(a)(42), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689 (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000)); see also Condon, supra note 394, at 254.  See generally Paula
Abrams, Population Politics: Reproductive Rights and U.S. Asylum Policy, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 881 (2000).
401. See Aliaskari, supra note 390, at 281 (arguing that courts should use the principle of
equality in Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to more effectively protect
women refugees); Peters, supra note 392, at 226, 245, 250 (noting that international law
adequately protects women from gender-based persecution but that the United States has
ignored its obligations to these global norms, and concluding that America cannot reconcile a
foreign policy that condemns persecution of women with “an immigration policy that rebukes
efforts of those able to escape to gain admission and refugee status in the U.S. territory”).
402. Thiele, supra note 388, at 221. 
403. See supra note 295 and accompanying text. 
404. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 295, at 15-16 (stating that U.S. courts often incorrectly
decide asylum claims because they fail to consider basic principles of human rights, and arguing
situation has also led many to argue that the United States should add gender
to the five enumerated factors currently providing the basis for asylum and
withholding claims in order to adequately protect aliens who are persecuted
on account of their sex.399  These calls for legislative action found
congressional support in 1996, when Congress modified the definition of
“refugee” to include forced sterilization and coerced family planning as part
of political persecution,400 thereby setting a precedent for statutorily expanding
asylum and withholding protections to encompass gender-based persecution.
Another argument supporting the addition of a sixth gender category to the
five enumerated grounds of protection is that gender is as unchangeable a
characteristic as race, and the severity of gender-based persecution is often
equal to or greater than other forms of persecution currently enjoying the
protection of U.S. asylum law.
In addition to legislatively expanding asylum law, placing greater emphasis
on whether the persecutor has violated global human rights standards could
further protect female persecution victims.401  Such a focus seems particularly
appropriate in light of the emerging recognition that women’s rights are
human rights.402  More broadly, international human rights norms should
inform all asylum and withholding adjudications,403 especially where an
alien’s persecution arises from state prosecution.404  A greater emphasis on
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that this failure is particularly “acute where the distinction between legitimate prosecution for
unlawful acts and retaliatory persecution on political or other grounds is at issue”); Isaacs, supra
note 97, at 732 (noting that international law can facilitate distinguishing between legitimate
prosecution and persecution under U.S. asylum law).
405. See supra notes 292, 296 and accompanying text. 
406. See Adell, supra note 36, at 791 (noting the “failure of the United States judiciary and
immigration administrative agencies to meaningfully apply international human rights law,”
which is not justified by policy considerations).
407. Fitzpatrick, supra note 295, at 20; Adell, supra note 36, at 798; see also Davis &
Atchue, supra note 2, at 120 (stating that the legislative intent behind U.S. asylum laws was to
protect “internationally recognized human rights and humanitarian concerns,” and arguing that
until courts “uphold the human rights purpose of the asylum statute . . . there will be no safe
haven for refugees in America”); Kristine M. Fox, Comment, Gender Persecution: Canadian
Guidelines Offer a Model for Refugee Determination in the United States, 11 ARIZ. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 117, 121 (1994). 
408. See supra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
409. No. 04-60080, 2005 WL 3178205 (5th Cir. Nov. 29, 2005).
these global norms would fulfill Congress’s clear intent that the Refugee Act
give “statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and
humanitarian concerns . . . .”405  Unfortunately, immigration and appellate
courts have largely failed to meet this expectation by refusing to meaningfully
apply global human rights standards,406 and cases like Fisher and Sadeghi
demonstrate that within the persecution/prosecution distinction, courts have
narrowly and inconsistently applied the rule that a state cannot legitimately
prosecute an alien for violating a law that is contrary to international human
rights norms.  Therefore, examining the “internationally unlawful character”
of the prosecution in question would achieve results more consistent with the
principles of refugee protection and would more fully comport with the
humanitarian spirit animating the Refugee Act.407
2. The Mixed-Motive Analysis
The mixed-motive analysis is a second component of the
prosecution/persecution distinction that has received disparate treatment
among the circuits.  As previously noted, many courts hold that an asylum or
withholding applicant does not have to prove that her persecution resulted
entirely from the government’s improper motivation.  Rather, demonstrating
that the mistreatment resulted in part from one of the protected characteristics
is sufficient.408  Although this rule’s application is critical for a just outcome,
circuits often fail to apply the mixed-motive analysis, as demonstrated in
Adam v. Gonzalez.409
In Adam, the citizens of the Mexican city of Reynosa, in the state of
Tamaulipas, elected Higareda Adam, who was allied with two prominent
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416. See cases cited supra notes 242-49.
417. Adam, 2005 WL 3178205, at *3.
418. Id. 
419. Id.  The Adam court’s refusal to apply the mixed-motive analysis is curious in light of
other Fifth Circuit precedent explicitly adopting that approach.  See Li v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d
500, 509 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The federal courts and the BIA have also recognized that an alien
may demonstrate that a persecutor’s actions were on account of a protected characteristic even
if the persecutor had mixed motivations; a persecutor does not have to be motivated solely by
the victim’s possession of a protected characteristic.” (citing Girma v. INS, 283 F.3d 664, 667-
68 (5th Cir. 2002)).
political opponents of governor-elect Thomas Yarrington, as mayor in 1998.410
Shortly after taking office, Yarrington informed Adam that he would “screw”
him because of Adam’s earlier opposition to Yarrington’s candidacy,411 and
around this time, Adam implemented several measures Yarrington opposed,
including efforts to combat drug trafficking.412  One month after Yarrington
threatened to “screw” Adam, Yarrington ordered an audit of a state agency
overseen by Adam, and the audit quickly resulted in criminal charges against
Adam, alleging embezzlement, abuse of authority, and falsification of
documents.  Yarrington supporters soon arrested Adam, removed him as
mayor and replaced him with a Yarrington supporter.413  In his asylum
application, Adam argued that the government was politically motivated in
bringing charges against him, and because his political opponents were still
in power, he would be at great risk of arrest, torture, and death if returned to
Mexico.414  Human rights organizations testifying on Adam’s behalf
confirmed these apprehensions.415
Confronted with these facts, the Ninth and Third Circuits would have likely
applied the mixed-motive analysis in determining Adam eligible for asylum
or withholding, because the Yarrington-controlled government’s prosecution
of Adam seemed to stem, at least partially, from his political opinion.416  The
Fifth Circuit, however, affirmed the immigration judge’s finding that Adam
merely wished to avoid legitimate criminal prosecution instead of political
persecution.417  Although noting that “criminal prosecution can equate with
persecution” where “the prosecution is motivated by one of the enumerated
factors,”418 the court failed to inquire whether political opposition to
Yarrington partly motivated Adam’s prosecution where such a motive seemed
plausible, if not apparent.419  By holding that Adam did not flee political
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420. Adam, 2005 WL 3178205, at *3.
421. Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 1994).  For additional analyses of the Sadeghi
case, see Isaacs, supra note 97, and Kathleen M. Kelly, Tenth Circuit Survey, Immigration Law,
73 DENV. U. L. REV. 787, 798 (1996). 





427. Id. at 1141-42.
428. Id. at 1143.
429. Id.  
persecution, “but rather appears to be fleeing from criminal prosecution,”420
the Fifth Circuit adopted a narrow application of the pretextual motive
exception and refused to consider the mixed-motive analysis, even though the
facts suggested it was warranted.
Sadeghi v. INS mirrors Adam in that the Tenth Circuit also failed to apply
the mixed-motive analysis when the facts arguably supported such an
inquiry.421  Ebrahim Sadeghi was an Iranian high school principal and political
dissident.422  One day, Hassan, a fourteen-year-old student, told Sadeghi that
he would soon be going off to fight in the Iraqi war in order to become “a
martyr for God,” but Sadeghi pleaded with Hassan not to go.423  Sadeghi later
surmised that Hassan had reported this conversation to the Iranian authorities,
because shortly thereafter, a group of armed national guards “came to the
school looking for” Sadeghi, while telling others that they would arrest
Sadeghi for his opposition to “the government and the Islamic revolution.”424
Sadeghi escaped from the school through a side door, and without returning
home, managed to obtain an exit permit.425  He eventually made his way to the
United States and applied for asylum, claiming that the Iranian government
would arrest, torture, and kill him if he returned to Iran.426
Although Sadeghi presented evidence that Iranians fleeing their country
because of antigovernment activities face imprisonment or death if returned
to Iran, the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals ordered
immigration officials to deport Sadeghi back to Iran, reasoning that he merely
feared prosecution, rather than political persecution, for opposing Hassan’s
military service.427  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, recognizing that
although the INS had not demonstrated the existence of an actual law
criminalizing Sadegui’s counseling of Hassan, there was “a reasonable
inference that Iran had laws which would punish interference with its wartime
efforts.”428  The court then stated the general rule that prosecution for illegal
activities is a legitimate government act and not persecution.429  The Tenth
Circuit ended its analysis without discussing the possibility that the Iranian
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430. The Sadeghi court held that the applicant bore the burden of disproving the existence
of the underlying law that was the basis of the purportedly criminal offense, id. at 1143,
although the dissenting opinion argued that this burden was improperly placed on the applicant,
instead of the INS, which had produced no evidence that the applicant had ever violated an
Iranian law, see id. at 1145-46 (Kane, J., dissenting).
431. See supra notes 239-50 and accompanying text.
432. See Kroi v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 04-12709, 2005 WL 1523509, at *4-5 (11th Cir.
Jun. 29, 2005); Shardar v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2004); Attal v. INS, No. 95-9514,
1996 WL 91929, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 4, 1996); Ozdemir v. INS, 46 F.3d 6 (5th Cir. 1994);
Kyambadde v. INS, No. 91-9505, 1992 WL 158087, at *3 (11th Cir. July 6, 1992).  In  Shardar
case, the Third Circuit ignored the mixed-motive analysis by holding that the government of
Bangladesh “legitimately prosecuted” a political dissident when it arrested him after a violent
demonstration and detained him in jail, beat him and kicked him in the face, and forced him to
falsely confess that he illegally possessed weapons and explosives, all the while shouting that
the alien’s political party leader’s “time is over. . . . Now is, is [Bangladesh Nationalist Party]
time.”  Sharder, 382 F.3d at 320.  Nevertheless, the court refused to deem the alien’s experience
persecution, id. at 325, even though the alien’s political opinions were clearly a driving motive
behind the police’s brutality.  In Attal, Jordanian security forces beat and tortured a Palestinian
for eight hours in what the court described as a legitimate attempt to “gain Attal’s cooperation
in obtaining information regarding the PLO activities of Attal’s brother and others in Syria.”
Attal, 1996 WL 91929, at *1.  The court refused to entertain the likely possibility that at least
part of the government’s motivation in torturing the alien arose from the suspicion that he
shared his brother’s sympathy with the Palestinian Liberation Organization.  Id.  Further, the
alien was later involved in a car accident with an army vehicle, where the police verbally
harassed the alien for being a Palestinian and detained him for five days after he engaged in a
“diatribe against the Jordanian government.”  Id. at *2, *4.  This treatment, and the probable
prison sentence resulting from it, were deemed legitimate state activity, id. at *3-4, even though
it was clear that the Palestinian’s ethnicity and political opinions triggered the excessively harsh
treatment for a mere automobile accident.  In Ozdemir, the Fifth Circuit ignored the superfluous
mixed-motive analysis in finding that the Turkish police’s interrogation, three-day detention,
and torture of an alien did not constitute grounds for asylum or withholding, as “the police
interrogated Ozdemir because they were seeking information on terrorist organizations,” even
where it seemed undeniable that the police suspected the alien of sympathizing with the terrorist
groups.  Ozdemir, 46 F.3d at 8.  Thus, the Fifth Circuit ignored the clear implication that the
alien was tortured because of imputed political opinion.  In Kyambadde, coup plotters abducted
a Ugandan government employee who opposed the coup on the day the coup seized control of
the government, and the employee was never heard from again.  Kyambadde, 1992 WL 158087,
at *1.  Although this might seem a clear instance of a politically-motivated kidnaping and
murder, the Tenth Circuit held that this apparent summary execution of a political opponent did
not amount to persecution because it might possibly be viewed as a legitimate “prosecution” of
government had targeted Sadeghi at least partially for his antigovernment
beliefs, rather than solely for violating a neutral law that prohibited counseling
minors not to join the army.430  In contrast, other circuits would likely have
discussed, if not applied, the mixed-motive framework on analogous facts.431
Significantly, Adam and Sadegui are emblematic of a broader reluctance of
courts to apply the mixed-motive analysis.432  By refusing to adopt this
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one suspected of “engaging in past abuse of power.”  Id. at *3.  Instead of applying the mixed-
motive analysis to hold that the murder of the political opponent was persecution if it resulted
in part from a political motive, the court suggested that such a politically-motivated, extra-
judicial kidnaping and assassination could not be persecution, because it might have resulted
in part from a legitimate motive.  Id.  This logic would bar even the most meritorious asylum
and withholding claims.  These cases are inconsistent with other decisions applying the more
generous mixed-motive analysis.  See, e.g., Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870 (9th Cir.
2005); Ratnam v. INS, 154 F.3d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1998); Singh v. Ilchert, 69 F.3d 375 (9th
Cir. 1995); Rajaratnam v. Moyer, 832 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Singh v. Ilchert,
801 F. Supp. 313 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
433. See Adam v. Gonzales, No. 04-60080, 2005 WL 3178205 (5th Cir. 2005).  
434. See Adarkar, supra note 53, at 219-20 (“The concept of a discrete unitary motive
underlying each human action is a fiction.”); Hall, supra note 27, at 111.
435. Hall, supra note 27, at 112; see also Foster, supra note 83, at 340 (contending that the
broad humanitarian underpinnings of asylum law require that any nexus or “on account” test
requiring the enumerated ground to be the only cause for fear of persecution should be rejected,
and arguing that a mixed-motive approach is “the most appropriate method of fulfilling the aims
and objectives of the [Refugee] Convention and of ensuring its contemporary relevance.”). 
436. See Isaacs, supra note 97, at 742 (noting that the inconsistent standards for establishing
persecution “turns the asylum process into a game of venue roulette, where the interpretation
of federal law depends on the circuit in which the asylum claim is heard”); Robert C. Leitner,
Comment, A Flawed System Exposed: The Immigration Adjudicatory System and Asylum for
Sexual Minorities, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 679, 681 (2004) (discussing how courts of appeals have
“marked out strikingly different positions on aspects of immigration law,” and arguing that “the
outcome of an alien’s case should not depend on his or her location in the country”).  This
heterogeneity among circuits in matters of immigration law stems largely from the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision to consider relatively few cases in that area.  See Isaacs, supra note 97, at 742
(arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should provide more “illumination to the asylum
standards in order to live up to our national and international obligations under the 1980
Refugee Act and the U.N. Protocol”); Leitner, supra.
approach, courts implicitly require an alien to show that the allegedly
invidious prosecution resulted solely from an improper motive.433  Requiring
an asylum applicant to demonstrate such “pure” persecution, however, is at
best problematic, because persecutors act from a variety of motives, and rarely
from a single impermissible purpose.434  By not applying the mixed-motive
analysis, U.S. immigration courts have at times denied asylum to aliens “who
had the misfortune of suffering under an unfocused persecutor.  Instead, the
humanitarian purpose of the Refugee Act compels granting relief if
persecution has at least partial links to the enumerated ground.”435  The refusal
to apply the mixed-motive analysis means that two asylum applicants with
identical stories of state-imposed persecution could possibly face two
divergent futures, depending on which court happens to consider their
claim.436  Without a uniform application of the mixed-motive doctrine, courts
differentiating between persecution and prosecution will continue to reach
inconsistent results that contradict the humanitarian values animating the
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437. See Musalo, supra note 29, at 1194-95; Adarkar, supra note 53, at 207-08, 219; Hall,
supra note 27, at 111.
438. Tuhin v. Ashcroft, No 02-2661, 2003 WL 1342995, at *4 (7th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003).
439. Id. at *1.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at *2.
443. Id. at *3-4.
444. Id. at *4.
Refugee Act’s enactment and the generous construction Congress intended
that Act to receive.437
B. Unaccountable Immigration Courts
In addition to the preceding barriers, victims of government-imposed
persecution confront a second obstacle in the insufficient and incorrect
analyses many immigration courts perform and in the diminished ability
appellate courts have to correct these errors.  First, immigration judges and the
BIA frequently fail to properly apply relevant legal principles in asylum or
withholding claims premised on state-imposed persecution.  For example, in
Tuhin v. Ashcroft, the Bangladesh police arrested Azim Tuhin during a
political demonstration,438 and then kicked him and hit him with batons before
taking him to jail, where they repeatedly beat him while warning him to cease
his political activism in the minority Jatiya Party.439  The following day,
authorities charged Tuhin with violating Bangladesh’s Special Powers Act and
Anti-Terrorism Act.440  He spent the next month incarcerated, where officers
beat him between seven and ten times and demanded that he renounce his
loyalty to the Jatiya Party.441  An American immigration judge denied Tuhin
asylum and withholding, even though it seemed apparent that the government
of Bangladesh had persecuted him for his political opinions.442  Fortunately,
the Seventh Circuit reversed, making clear that the immigration judge’s legal
conclusion that Tuhin had fled prosecution and not persecution “was based on
a fundamental misunderstanding of the law” that “misses the entire point of
Tuhin’s asylum claim.”443  Further, the appellate court noted that the
immigration judge “did not address any” of the evidence showing that the
Bangladeshi laws Tuhin allegedly violated were commonly used to punish
political minorities for such minor offenses as obstructing traffic, with
sentences ranging from five years to death, “focusing instead solely on the
facial legitimacy of the charges.”444
The immigration judge’s incomplete analysis and incorrect application of
the law in Tuhin reflects a broader phenomenon within immigration law of
lower level agency adjudicators issuing rulings that fail to properly apply legal
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445. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that the
immigration judge and the affirming BIA reached a decision that “ran squarely counter to our
precedent”); Singh v. INS, No. 00-70296, 2002 WL 1033562, at *1 (9th Cir. May 22, 2002);
Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (“The police in this case beat Bandari
repeatedly and daily demanded his confession to a crime he did not commit because they found
him embracing a Muslim woman.  No reasonable factfinder could conclude that the CPM’s
treatment of Bandari did not constitute persecution.”); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508 (9th
Cir. 1995) (“The BIA failed to discuss, let alone attempt to distinguish, contrary Ninth Circuit
authority holding that extra-judicial punishment of suspected anti-government guerrillas can
constitute persecution on account of imputed political opinion.”). 
446. Chang v. INS, 119 F.3d 1055, 1058 (3d Cir. 1997).
447. Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th Cir. 1992).
448. Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 2004).
449. Rodriguez-Roman v. INS, 98 F.3d 416, 420 (9th Cir. 1996).
450. Kaur v. INS, No. 00-70198, 12 2001 WL 724955, at *1 (9th Cir. June 27, 2001).
451. Wang v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).  The
Third Circuit panel further observed in Wang’s case that “[t]he tone, the tenor, the
disparagement, and the sarcasm of the [immigration judge] seem more appropriate to a court
television show than a federal court proceeding,” and ultimately granted the petition for review
on the grounds that “the [immigration judge]’s conduct so tainted the proceedings below that
we cannot be confident that Wang was afforded the opportunity fully to develop the factual
principles governing the persecution/prosecution distinction set forth by the
courts of appeals.  Moreover, the Board of Immigration Appeals often
summarily affirms these incorrect rulings without sufficient analysis, which
the circuit courts have found particularly frustrating.445  Circuit courts often
express their frustration in unusually strong language, criticizing immigration
judges and the BIA for their faulty analyses.  For example, the Third Circuit
chastised an immigration judge for issuing a “delphic oral opinion” in denying
an asylum claim,446 while the Seventh Circuit criticized the BIA for its
“scanty, illogical, and apparently ill-informed analysis of the record.”447  That
circuit evaluated another immigration judge’s decision by concluding, “[t]here
is very deep confusion here.”448  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit granted asylum
to a Cuban facing political persecution by overruling an immigration judge’s
“Kafka-esque decision,”449 and overturned another BIA decision that had an
“infirm legal basis.”450  This criticism is atypically harsh in a judicial climate
tending toward subdued criticism of lower courts.  
Although these critiques describe improper denials of asylum claims based
on state-imposed persecution, they reveal a growing trend of circuit courts
employing intensely disparaging language to describe the inadequate analyses
and often unprofessional behavior characterizing adjudications in all types of
asylum claims.  For instance, the Third Circuit has lamented that it must
constantly “caution[] immigration judges against making intemperate or
humiliating remarks during immigration proceedings,”451 and has noted that
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predicates of his claim.”  Id. at 269, 271. 
452. Id. at 268.
453. Rexha v. Gonzales, No. 04-3700, 2006 WL 229796, at *5 n.3 (6th Cir. Jan. 31, 2006)
(citing Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2006)).
454. N’Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 502 (6th Cir. 2006).
455. Metko v. Gonzales, No. 04-3881, 2005 WL 3420046, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2005)
(Martin, J. concurring) (citation omitted).
456. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005).  
457. Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 738 (7th Cir. 2005).
458. Grupee v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 2005).
459. Dawoud v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005).
“[a] disturbing pattern of [immigration judge] misconduct has emerged
notwithstanding the fact that some of our sister circuits have repeatedly
echoed our concerns.”452  Similarly, appellate judges from the Sixth Circuit
have recognized that “horror stories persist of nasty, arrogant, and
condescending immigration courts,”453 and that such poor immigration court
decision making is unacceptable because “[a] nation so concerned with
freedom and liberty ought to accord a little more respect and dignity to those
who seek from us that which we claim to be so proud to offer.”454  Further,
another Sixth Circuit judge expressed the frustration running throughout many
circuit court decisions over the inadequate performance of some immigration
judges:
Although I am sympathetic with the difficulties faced by
immigration courts and its caseload, it should be responsible for
providing a complete and accurate determination on asylum claims.
Let us not forget the impact of these hearings on the lives of the
individuals involved.  The least we can ask of the immigration
court is to provide a thorough and complete analysis for its
determination beyond identifying minor inconsistencies, cultural
differences, or language barriers.455
Echoing these concerns, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has
declared that “the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has
fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”456  Elsewhere, that
circuit has found an immigration judge’s factual conclusion “totally
unsupported by the record,”457 and in another case, the immigration judge’s
unexplained decision was “hard to take seriously.”458  Additionally, in
Dawoud v. Gonzales, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit determined
that “[t]he [immigration judge]’s opinion was riddled with inappropriate and
extraneous comments,”459 and in Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, the same appellate
court concluded that “[t]he procedure that the [immigration judge] employed
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460. Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005).
461.  See, e.g., Benslimane, 430 F.3d 828.  In Benslimane, Judge Posner cites many cases
outside Seventh Circuit jurisprudence which have been extremely critical of immigration judges.
Id. at 829 (citing Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that
the immigration judge’s finding is “grounded solely on speculation and conjecture”); Fiadjoe
v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 411 F.3d 135, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding that the
immigration judge’s “hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive” conduct toward the petitioner “by
itself would require a rejection of his credibility finding”); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that “the [immigration judge]’s assessment of
Petitioner’s credibility was skewed by prejudgment, personal speculation, bias and conjecture”);
Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) (remarking that “it is the [immigration
judge]’s conclusion, not [the asylum applicant’s] testimony, that ‘strains credulity’”)).  For
further examples of circuit courts of appeals’ decisions expressing extreme frustration and
disapproval of the immigration courts and the BIA, see Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554,
560-61 (7th Cir. 2004) (Evans, J., concurring) (“[I]n failing to find substantial evidence in the
record sufficient to affirm the decisions of the immigration judges, we have made disparaging
comments about the quality of their work: The immigration judge ‘took over the questioning
so that in the end the judge, rather than the attorney, had elicited whatever testimony [the
petitioner] was able to give.’  The immigration judge ‘made up his mind about the case and was
subsequently unwilling to listen . . . .’  ‘There is a gaping hole in the reasoning of the . . .
immigration judge.’  These cases show ‘a pattern of serious misapplications by the . . .
immigration judges of elementary principles of adjudication.’  The immigration judge’s
‘analysis was so inadequate as to raise questions of adjudicative competence.’  The immigration
judge ‘ignored the evidence.’  The immigration judge’s analysis of the evidence ‘was woefully
inadequate.’  The immigration judge displayed an ‘astounding lapse of logic.’  The immigration
judge’s opinion ‘is riven with errors . . . .’” (omissions and second alteration in original)), and
Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005,
at 1.
462. Guchshenkov, 366 F.3d at 560-61 (Evans, J., concurring).
463. N’Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 501-02 (6th Cir. 2006).  Further, in addressing the
immigration judges Gonzalez continued: “I urge you always to bear in mind the significance of
your cases and the lives they affect.  To the aliens who stand before you, you are the face of
American justice.  Not all will be entitled to the relief they seek.  But I insist that each be treated
with courtesy and respect.  Anything less would demean the office that you hold and the
Department in which you serve.”  Id. 
464. For a typical illustration of harsh appellate court criticism of the BIA, consider
in this case is an affront to [the asylum seeker’s] right to be heard.”460  These
excerpts are not isolated opinions, but instead represent a widespread
conviction among federal appellate judges that immigration judges frequently
fail to give asylum seekers a fair hearing.461  Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales has echoed the federal judiciary’s conclusion that a great many
immigration judges are “woefully inadequate,”462 acknowledging that “there
are some [immigration courts] whose conduct can aptly be described as
intemperate or even abusive and whose work must improve.”463
Academic and judicial criticism of immigration judges, as well as the
BIA,464 has “grown particularly severe” in recent years,465 and has contributed
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2007
182 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:109
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, in which the Seventh Circuit vacated a BIA order
removing an asylum seeker to his come country.  In that case, Judge Posner called the BIA’s
order, “completly arbitrary,” id. at 833, and also noted the extraordinary rate at which his circuit
reversed and remanded BIA decisions:
In the year ending on the date of the argument, different panels of this court
reversed the Board of Immigration Appeals in whole or part in a staggering 40
percent of the 136 petitions to review the Board that were resolved on the merits.
The corresponding figure, for the 82 civil cases during this period in which the
United States was the appellee, was 18 percent.
Id. at 829.  He then noted that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has used language that has
“frequently been severe” in faulting the BIA for “fall[ing] below the minimum standards of legal
justice.”  Id. at 829-30 (citing Ssali v. Gonzalez, 424 F.3d 556, 563 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that
“this very significant mistake suggests that the Board was not aware of the most basic facts of
[the petitioner’s] case”); Kourski v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that
“[t]here is a gaping hole in the reasoning of the board and the immigration judge”); Niam v.
Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 652, 654 (7th Cir. 2003) (remarking caustically that “[t]he elementary
principles of administrative law, the rules of logic, and common sense seem to have eluded the
Board in this as in other cases”)).
465. Aaron Leiderman, Preserving the Constitution’s Most Important Human Right: Judicial
Review of Mixed Questions Under the Real ID Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1408 (2006).
466. Id. (“[A] recent study examining thousands of asylum decisions from 1994 to early
2005 found vast disparities in grants of asylum depending on the particular immigration judge
and the applicant’s country of origin.” (citing Rachel L. Swarns, Study Finds Disparities in
Judges’ Asylum Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A15 (describing this study and quoting
one commentator as stating that the study belies the government’s “commitment to providing
a uniform application of the nation’s immigration laws in all cases”))); see also infra note 485
and accompanying text.
467. See Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 41.  
468. The Department of Justice Published the Final Rule restructuring the BIA on August
26, 2002.  Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management,
67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2003)).  
to the sense that there are “vast disparities in grants of asylum,” and that the
outcome of an asylum adjudication has less to do with the merits of the
application than with the identity of the particular immigration judge deciding
the case.466  The harsh language scholars and circuit judges have employed to
describe the poor quality of asylum adjudications demonstrates that
immigration judges and the BIA often reach incorrect outcomes and employ
unfair proceedings in evaluating asylum claims.  Nevertheless, recent
procedural changes have, instead of addressing this problem, increased the
likelihood that immigration judges will return true victims of state-imposed
persecution to their home governments.467  
In 2002, the Department of Justice announced several major changes to the
BIA’s structure and procedure known as the “Procedural Reforms to Improve
Case Management,”468 and these reforms have greatly “augment[ed] the
discretion of immigration judges, by significantly limiting the ability of the
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469. Shanyn Gillispie, Note, Terror in the Home: The Failure of U.S. Asylum Law to Protect
Battered Women and a Proposal to Right the Wrong of In Re R-A-, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
131, 136 (2003).
470. Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 75.
471. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(4) (2003); see also Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 49-50.  
472. Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 75-76.  Further, under the 2002 regulations, when the BIA
affirms without a written opinion, it does not incorporate the immigration judge’s reasoning,
instead only affirming the result.  See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(4)(ii); see also John Guendelsberger,
Judicial Deference to Agency Decisions in Removal Proceedings in Light of INS v. Ventura,
18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 605, 644 (2004).
473. Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 76.  Burkhardt relied here on the reasoning of the First
Circuit Court of Appeals: 
“[T]he very nature of the one-line affirmance may mean that BIA members are not
in fact engaged in the review required by regulation and [appellate] courts will not
be able to tell.  Immigration decisions, especially in asylum cases, may have life
or death consequences, and so the costs of error are very high.”  
Id. at 94 (quoting Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 377 (1st Cir. 2003)).  Burkhardt offers an
excellent analysis of the problems associated with single BIA member one-line affirmance of
immigration judges, and notes that BIA members frequently issue up to fifty decisions per day,
or over one every ten minutes assuming a nine-hour work day.  Id. (citing Georgis v. Ashcroft,
328 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir. 2003); Albathani, 318 F.3d at 378); see also Lisa Getter & Jonathan
Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2003, at A1, cited
in N’Diom v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 501 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006) (“The article discusses the
speedy rate at which the Board of Immigration Appeals decides cases and describes how two
Board members each decide more than fifty cases on one day.  This means that if the Board
members worked a 9 hour day without any breaks for the restroom, lunch, or otherwise, each
case received approximately ten minutes of attention despite the fact that ordinarily, immigration
cases produce records in the hundreds of pages, and that many of those seeking relief allege that
they will be tortured or killed if deported.”).
474. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (2003); see also Gillispie, supra note 469, at 136.  However, a three-
member panel of the BIA members is used in a few narrow categories.  8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(6)
(2003).
BIA to review their findings.”469  Prior to 2002, the BIA had issued written
opinions “in the vast majority of appeals” from immigration judges,470 but the
Procedural Reforms directed the BIA to dispose of the majority of these
appeals without issuing a written opinion.471  Some feel that this change
diminishes immigration judges’ incentive to comprehensively engage an
asylum seeker’s claim with a rigorous legal analysis,472 in addition to
obscuring “the reasoning underpinning Board decisions, making it more
difficult for appellate courts to review those decisions.”473  Further, the
reforms of 2002 provided that single members of the BIA must dispose of
appeals from immigration judges.474  Critics charge, however, that single-
member BIA decisions, when coupled with the “elimination of written
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475. Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 96. 
476. Id. at 50.
477. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 278 n.2 (1966) (“In conformity with its usual
practice, the Board made its own independent determination of the factual issues after de novo
examination of the record.”); Cordoba-Chavez v. INS, 946 F.2d 1244, 1249 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“[T]he BIA may determine a case de novo . . . .”); Matter of B——, 7 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A.
1955); Guendelsberger, supra note 472, at 614 (citing In re S-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 462, 463-64
(B.I.A. 2002) (explaining that “the Board had broad authority to engage in a de novo review of
the record underlying the immigration judge’s decision and make its own independent findings
of fact, irrespective of those made by the immigration judge.”)); 1 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN, & STEVEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 3.05[5][b], at 3-54
(rev. ed. 2006).
478. 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(3)(i) (2003); see also Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 50-51;
Guendelsberger, supra note 472, at 614-15. 
479. Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 77. 
480. Id. at 78; cf. Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87,
113 (1999) (maintaining that a de novo standard is preferred because it presents “the prospective
threat of reversal [that] may induce lower courts to draft more comprehensive and precise
opinions”). 
481. The 2002 Procedural Reforms of the BIA also shortened the deadlines for immigration
lawyers to brief and prepare for appeal.  Compare 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e) (2002) (permitting the BIA
to fix a time for oral arguments at its own discretion), and id. § 3.3(c) (requiring briefs to be
filed within thirty days of filing a notice of appeal), with 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(8)(i) (2003)
opinions in the vast majority of cases, radically decreases both the number and
thoughtfulness of viewpoints brought to bear on any give case.”475
Perhaps more significantly, the 2002 Procedural Reforms  altered the Board
of Immigration Appeals’ standard for reviewing asylum determinations at the
immigration judge level.476  Where the BIA previously conducted a de novo
review of the immigration courts’ findings of fact and credibility,477 the
reforms dictate that it now must evaluate “whether the findings of the
immigration judge [were] clearly erroneous.”478  Opponents contend that
substituting the “clear error” standard for de novo review “will increase the
propensity of [immigration judges] to decide cases in accordance with their
subconscious ideological predilections.”479  Moreover, critics make
contentions like the following:
The Procedural Reforms pose the risk that some IJs, knowing that
their decisions are immune to review unless they have made an
error and that error is “clear,” may take less care in making
thoughtful decisions based on a thorough examination of the facts,
particularly in light of increasing caseloads and pressure to resolve
cases promptly.480
These and other aspects of the 2002 Procedural Reforms have received
vociferous criticism from scholars, immigration lawyers, and federal judges,481
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(establishing a nintey-day time limit for single-member adjudications and a 180-day time limit
for three-member adjudications), and id. § 3.3(c) (requiring briefs to be filed within twenty-one
days of filing a notice of appeal).  For a detailed criticism of this change, see Burkhardt, supra
note 6, at 83-85; Bradley J. Wyatt, Note, Even Aliens Are Entitled to Due Process: Extending
Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing to Board of Immigration Appeals Procedural Reforms, 12 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 605, 636 (2004).  Additionally, the reforms reduced the size of the Board
of Immigration Appeals by over half, from twenty-three members to eleven.  8 C.F.R. §
3.1(a)(1) (2003).  For more discussion of this reduction, see Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 80-83;
Guendelsberger, supra note 472, at 612 & n.41; Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and
Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 459, 475
(2006); Wyatt, supra, at 481.  Also, the reforms eliminated oral arguments before the BIA in
the vast majority of asylum appeals.  See Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 83-85.
482. Wyatt, supra note 481, at 605; cf. Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 89; Letter from American
Immigration Lawyers Ass’n to Charles K. Adkins-Blanch, Gen. Counsel, Executive Office for
Immigration Review (Mar. 20, 2002), available at http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?
docid=2093 (arguing that the reforms are unnecessary and that they will “tilt the balance in
favor of expeditiousness, instead of fostering careful and just adjudications, thereby impairing
the due process rights of individuals while undermining the Board’s capacity to provide
meaningful appellate review”).
483. Emily Heller, Clash over Plan for Immigrant Appeals, NAT’L L.J., July 15, 2002, at A1.
Many federal appeals decisions support this view of the BIA.  See, e.g., Guchshenkov v.
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 2004) (complaining of the BIA’s “characteristically
perfunctory opinion affirming the immigration judge”).
484. See supra notes 438-61 and accompanying text.
485. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 186 (2003) (describing the effects
of the Procedural Reforms of 2002: “Similarly situated people will be treated quite differently,
simply because of the political affiliation of the judges on the particular panel.  As a result, the
law is likely to have real inconsistency, in a way that does violence to the ideal of the rule of
law. . . . Unfairness is an inevitable result”); Burkhardt, supra note 6, at 89; see also supra note
466 and accompanying text.
486. 502 U.S. 478 (1992). 
who feel that the changes will dramatically “reduce the quality and care of the
BIA’s decision-making process”482 to such an extent that BIA rulings will
amount in practice to little more than “rubber-stamping” the decisions of
immigration judges.483  This prospect is troubling when one considers the
harsh criticism federal appellate courts consistently level at these agency
officials for their inept handling of asylum adjudications.484  By further
insulating these immigration judges from meaningful review at the BIA level,
the 2002 Procedural Reforms increase the likelihood that similarly situated
asylum applicants will receive disparate treatment depending on the
immigration official that reviews their cases.485
This diminished accountability of immigration judges resulting from the
2002 reforms is particularly significant in light of the great deference appellate
courts already accord the BIA and immigration judges.  In INS v. Elias-
Zacarias,486 the U.S. Supreme Court established a “quintessentially
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487. Johnson, supra note 293, at 470 (noting that the Court did not consider the nature or
purpose of the Refugee Act in formulating the standard of review in asylum claims and ignored
the “delicate life and liberty interests at stake”).  For a broader examination of the Elias-
Zacarias decision, see Stephen M. Knight, Shielded from Review: The Questionable Birth and
Development of the Asylum Standard of Review Under Elias-Zacarias, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
133, 139 (2005); Matthew H. Joseph, Note, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Elias-
Zacarias: Partially Closing the Door on Political Asylum, 52 MD. L. REV. 478, 497 (1993);
Andrew Pau & J. Nathan Diament, Recent Development, Narrowing “Political Opinion” as
Grounds for Asylum — I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 112 S. Ct. 812 (1992), 33 HARV. INT’L L.J. 610
(1992).
488. See Joseph, supra note 487, at 497-98. 
489. Mere weeks after the Court handed down its opinion, one group of observers warned
that the Court’s new version of the substantial evidence standard of review closely “resemble[d]
the abuse of discretion standard of review, which generally is considered to be more deferential
to the agency.”  Deborah Anker, Carolyn P. Blum & Kevin R. Johnson, The Supreme Court’s
Decision in INS v. Elias-Zacarias: Is There Any “There” There?, 69 INTERPRETER RELEASES
285, 291 (1992).  Similarly, another commentator during this time urged that  after Elias-
Zacarias, the standard of review in asylum appeals “is now virtually solidified as abuse of
discretion for the entire decision, including the determination of whether an alien meets the
definition of ‘refugee’”.  Joseph, supra note 487, at 502.  “No longer will immigration statutes
be applied to favor aliens.”  Id. 
490. Joseph, supra note 487, at 499 & n.147 (“To reverse the BIA finding we must find that
the evidence not only supports the conclusion, but compels it . . . .” (omission in original)
(quoting Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1)).  In adding this “compelling” language to the
standard of review governing asylum cases, Elias-Zacarias appeared to rely on a section of the
Immigration and Naturalization Act codifying the substantial evidence test - a section that
required federal courts of appeal to affirm the agency’s “findings of fact, if supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.”  8 U.S.C.
§ 1105a(a)(4) (1994), repealed by Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-612.  This
language is nearly identical to the standard for factual review under the Administrative
Procedure Act, which provides that an agency may not issue an order unless it is “on
consideration of the whole record . . . supported by and in accordance with the reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.”  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).
Curiously, Elias-Zacarias “interpreted this language to mean that a court of appeals could
reverse the BIA only if the evidence existed so strongly in the alien’s favor that it compelled any
deferential” standard of review for federal appellate courts reviewing the
BIA’s asylum and withholding decisions.487  That decision rejected the view
held by most courts of appeals that refugee status is a factual determination
subject to the traditional substantial evidence standard of review.488  Before
Elias-Zacarias, a federal appellate court could reverse the BIA if substantial
evidence did not support the BIA’s decision, but that holding directed courts
of appeals to apply a far more deferential standard resembling the abuse of
discretion standard,489 under which an appellate court could only reverse a
BIA decision if the evidence would have compelled a reasonable fact-finder
to reach an opposite result.490  Li v. Gonzalez illustrates the practical
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reasonable fact-finder” to find the requisite persecution that gives an applicant refugee status
and asylum eligibility.  Joseph, supra note 487, at 499. 
491. Li v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2005), vacated, 429 F.3d 1153 (5th Cir. 2005).
In 1996, Congress amended the Immigration and Naturalization Act’s provision governing
judicial review to codify the heightened substantial evidence standard of Elias-Zacarias,
requiring that when federal courts of appeal review BIA decisions, “administrative findings of
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary.”  Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, sec. 306(a),
§ 242(b)(4)(B), 110 Stat. at 3009-608 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000)).  For
additional discussion of this codification, see Knight, supra note 487, at 140.
492. Li, 420 F.3d at 511 (footnote omitted). 
493. See, e.g., Metko v. Gonzalez, No. 04-3881, 2005 WL 3420046, at *4 (6th Cir. Dec. 14,
2005) (Martin, J., concurring).  
494. Scholars have criticized Elias-Zacarias for adopting its novel interpretation of the
substantial evidence standard of review in a footnote to a “notably short opinion” that gave
little, if any, indication in those few paragraphs that a new and important doctrine [was] being
announced.”  Knight, supra note 487, at 139.  Further, scholars fault the decision because “it
is not apparent what legal or policy basis underlies” its “weak and unsettled basis”:
Prior to the Elias-Zacarias decision, several years of litigation over the
appropriate standard of review in asylum adjudication had resulted in the
widespread adoption of the substantial evidence standard over the government’s
preferred abuse of discretion standard.  The standard of review was not briefed in
Elias-Zacarias, and the Court did not discuss the issue at any length, weigh the
legal or policy arguments, or cite any of the cases that had previously considered
the issue.  Instead, it issued a decision that appeared to recast the law with
sweeping new language.  In fact, the Court’s language was not drawn from any
precedent, and the case referenced to justify the Court’s new rule provides no such
support.  There appears to be little legal basis on which to interpret the Elias-
Zacarias decision as dramatically limiting the standard of review for asylum cases.
consequence of the highly deferential standard of review announced in Elias-
Zacarias and its subsequent codifications.491  In Li, the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the immigration judge and the BIA in holding that a Chinese Christian was not
a victim of religious persecution, but it did so reluctantly:
[W]hile we may abhor China's practice of restricting its citizens
from gathering in a private home to read the gospel and sing
hymns, and abusing offenders, like Li, who commit such acts, that
is a moral judgment not a legal one.  We are restricted by the
confines of the withholding of removal standard and the record
before us.  Based on both, we cannot conclude that the BIA erred
in denying Li withholding of removal.492
Li reveals the dilemma facing many appellate courts that disagree with the
lower courts’ findings of fact or law but are unable to reverse because of the
highly deferential standard of review set forth in Elias-Zacarias.493  This
decision, widely criticized,494 imposes upon asylum applicants a uniquely
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Id. at 151; see also Joseph, supra note 487 at 499 (“The Court did not explain why it read this
language in this particular way.”); Anker, Blum & Johnson, supra note 489, at 286 (criticizing
the “brevity of the opinion”). 
495. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 487, at 151 (echoing the widely held belief that the
decision “single[d] out asylum-seekers for [a] uniquely hands-off form of judicial review”).
496. Knight, supra note 487, at 133.  To illustrate, one member of the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals recently complained that he was “bound in this appellate review by the
congressionally prescribed standard of review that is, unfortunately, nearly insurmountable for
the appealing alien.”  Metko, 2005 WL 3420046, at *4 (Martin, J., concurring).  Paradoxically,
these courts nominally maintain that they are applying a “substantial evidence” standard of
review, but they describe this standard in far more deferential terms.  See, e.g., Maksakuli v.
U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 05-16395, 2006 WL 2456542, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2006) (per
curiam) (“The BIA’s factual determination that an alien is not entitled to asylum must be upheld
if it is supported by substantial evidence.  Under this highly deferential standard of review, a
denial of asylum may be reversed only if the evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to
find that the requisite fear of persecution exists.  We recently explained that ‘only in rare cases
does the record compel the conclusion that an applicant suffered past persecution or has a well-
founded fear of future persecution.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Silva v. U.S. Attorney Gen.,
448 F.3d 1229, 1239 (11th Cir. 2006))); see also, e.g., Singh v. U.S. Attorney Gen., No. 05-
15393, 2006 WL 2134645, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 1, 2006) (noting that the standard of review
in asylum law is “highly deferential”); Gu v. Gonzales, 454 F.3d 1014, 1018-19 (9th Cir. 2006)
(describing the substantial evidence standard in asylum law as “strict”); Chen v. U.S. INS, 359
F.3d 121, 128 (2d Cir. 2004) (same (quoting Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir.
2003)); Miah v. Ashcroft, 346 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. 2003) (using “extraordinarily deferential”
to describe the substantial evidence standard); Singh-Kaur v. INS, 183 F.3d 1147, 1149 (9th
Cir. 1999) (describing the standard as “extremely deferential” (quoting Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d
1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995))); Wu Biao Chen v. INS, 344 F.3d 272, 275 (2d Cir. 2003) (terming
the substantial evidence standard of review “exceedingly narrow”).  
497. Knight, supra note 487, at 140.
498. In the immediate wake of Elias-Zacarias, commentators warned that the decision would
“significantly restrict the ability of the circuit courts to reverse BIA rulings,” Joseph, supra note
487, at 497, and predicted that the heightened substantial evidence standard “will greatly limit
the ability of the courts of appeals to review BIA decisions for consistency, fairness, and
appropriateness.  Only glaringly unreasonable decisions will be overturned.  Thus, BIA
decisions, and the ideological biases upon which they may be based, will go largely unchecked
by the judiciary.”  Id. at 499-500 (footnote omitted).  Others worried that it might be “used to
justify a return to an era of judicial abdication to the executive branch in immigration matters.”
deferential application of the substantial evidence standard of review,495 and
circuit courts of appeals “now describe an asylum-seeker’s overall burden on
appeal in sweeping, restrictive language that appears all but
insurmountable.”496 This novel formulation of the substantial evidence
standard of review gives immigration adjudicators and the BIA almost
unfettered discretion by “dramatically narrow[ing] the nature and quality of
appellate review available to refugees seeking asylum.”497  Thus, this
formulation increases the likelihood that persecuted aliens will face
deportation after lower courts incorrectly apply the law.498  According
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Anker, Blum & Johnson, supra note 487, at 291.  The passage of more than a decade has
confirmed this views, leading some observers to conclude that this decision’s “compelling
evidence” standard has significantly limited the role of judicial review in asylum and
withholding determinations, and has “thus made the asylum review standard considerably more
narrow than the kind of review available in other administrative contexts.”  Susan Kerns, Note,
Country Conditions Documentation in U.S. Asylum Cases: Leveling the Evidentiary Playing
Field, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 197, 212 (2000).  Another echoes this belief, contending
that the Supreme Court’s “recasting of the substantial evidence standard is posing a perhaps
unique obstacle to asylum-seekers.”  Knight, supra note 487, at 134.  The feeling seems
widespread that this “hyper-deferential approach” ignores the unique concerns, interests, and
obligations at stake in asylum adjudications, and “creates a formidable barrier to correcting any
erroneous denials of asylum eligibility.”  Kerns, supra, at 212; see also Burkhardt, supra note
6, at 89-90. 
499. See Johnson, supra note 293, at 453-54, 499-500; Heebner, supra note 28, at 551;
Samahon, supra note 35, at 2213.
500. Johnson, supra note 293, at 453.  Indeed, there is a growing sentiment that the
American asylum system “is not functioning to effectively protect victims of persecution
abroad.”  Amy Hughes, Note, Asylum Proceedings: A System Riddled with Deference, 9 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 233, 258-59 (2003).
501. See supra notes 438-66 and accompanying text.
502. See Thomas, supra note 38, at 799 (citing Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212,
§ 101(a), 94 Stat. 102, 102). 
appellate courts greater ability to meaningfully review the decisions of
immigration courts and the BIA is necessary because those courts often reach
haphazard and illogical results and strictly construe each element of the
refugee definition in order to limit the number of successful applications.499
Indeed, the INS has consistently received criticism for its “abuse, ineptitude,
and overemphasis on enforcement with a concomitant lack of sensitivity to the
delicate life and liberty interests at stake, particularly in deportation
proceedings.”500  In sum, immigration officials frequently apply incorrect or
insufficient analyses in denying legitimate claims for refuge based on state-
imposed and other manifestations of persecution,501 but recent immigration
reforms and an inexplicably deferential standard of review preclude federal
appellate courts from effectively remedying these errors.
Conclusion
In passing the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress declared that “it is the
historic policy of the United States to respond to the urgent needs of persons
subject to persecution in their homeland.”502  To uphold this ideal, American
courts encountering the persecution/prosecution distinction must work toward
greater clarity and uniformity by expanding the human rights exception and
by choosing to apply the crucial mixed-motive analysis.  For their part,
American policymakers should reevaluate the current asylum apparatus to
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ensure that each asylum and withholding application receives an adequate
analysis at the immigration judge level and that reviewing courts are equipped
with the necessary tools to correct lower court errors.  These changes will
significantly improve the equitable adjudication of cases deciding whether
prosecution or  other forms of abuse have become persecution.  Further, the
addition of gender to the five factors currently afforded protection under U.S.
asylum law is necessary to fully realize America’s commitment to protecting
the persecuted.
This discussion began by observing that the United States has consistently
remained a safe harbor where oppressed minorities may find shelter.
Vigilantly upholding this unique American heritage by protecting a handful
of the earth’s persecuted is an obligation our history imposes upon us, and in
keeping that promise, we not only keep faith with our past, we are given the
opportunity to define our future.  Let us agree that this future will be a better
one if it welcomes the hurting and the hunted.
Michael English
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